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GIVING BITE TO THE EU-U.S. DATA PRIVACY SAFE HARBOR:
MODEL SOLUTIONS FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT*
Daniel R. Leathers†
In 1998, the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) set
out on an ambitious project to develop a program by which U.S.-based
companies could conform to the strict EU data privacy directive when
transferring EU citizens’ data. In effect, the program sought to reconcile
EU and U.S. privacy laws when a U.S.-based company used or transferred
EU citizens’ data. After two years of negotiations, the U.S. and the EU finalized a program now commonly known as the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor.
Yet, since the Safe Harbor’s inception, the program has been subject to heavy criticism from privacy advocates and an EU oversight committee. The heaviest criticism is levied against the Safe Harbor’s inadequate
internal and external enforcement mechanisms.
This Note proposes several improvements and modifications to the
Safe Harbor’s enforcement mechanisms, while acknowledging and addressing various U.S. law impediments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy no longer can mean anonymity . . . it should mean that government and businesses properly safeguards people’s private communications
and financial information.
—Donald Kerr, Principal Deputy Director of U.S. National Intelligence1

Everyday millions people in the European Union access websites
owned and operated in the United States.2 They upload personal photos, log
into bank accounts, make payments with credit cards, and input search inquiries. Massive amounts of data leave the control of consumers, and, more
importantly, the jurisdictional reach of the European Union.
In 1998, the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) set
out on an ambitious project to develop a program by which U.S.-based multinational companies and data processors (Companies) could conform to the
strict EU data privacy directive (Data Directive) when transferring EU
member-state citizens’ (EU Citizens) data.3 In effect, the program sought to
reconcile EU and U.S. privacy laws when a Company used EU Citizens’
data within the U.S. or transferred EU Citizens’ data to or from the U.S.

1

Pamela Hess, Intel Official: Expect Less Privacy, Huffington Post, Nov. 11, 2007,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20071111/terrorist-surveillance/.
2
The twenty-seven European Union countries have almost 300 million internet users, a
number that is growing every month. European Union Internet Usage Stats and Population
Statistics, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats9.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2008).
3
Council Directive 95/46/EC of the European parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ No. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data Directive].
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After two years of negotiations,4 the U.S.5 and the EU6 finalized the program and in the Safe Harbor Agreement (Safe Harbor) in late July 2000.
Yet, since the Safe Harbor’s inception, the program has been subject to heavy criticism from privacy advocates7 and an EU oversight committee.8 The heaviest criticism is levied against the Safe Harbor’s inadequate internal and external enforcement mechanisms. The Safe Harbor designates the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as the primary external enforcement arm of the program, but as of 2004, the FTC had not prosecuted a
single Company for violating the Safe Harbor’s protection of EU Citizens’
privacy rights.9
The lack of enforcement has left citizens of EU member states, who
ordinarily rely on enforcement by national privacy agencies,10 to become
their own police agents and report Safe Harbor violations on their own.11
For example, a data breach at a Company could lead to thousands of stolen
identities. Within the United States, data breach notification laws vary widely;12 and worse, under the Safe Harbor, a Company has no requirement to
4

Many documents were sent back and forth between the EU and the U.S. during the
negotiations. See Documents adopted by the Data Protection Working Party 1999,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/workinggroup/wpdocs/1999_en.htm.
5
The U.S. Department of Commerce published the final version of the agreement in the
Federal Register on July 24, 2000. Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666 (July
24, 2000). For consistency, this Note cites the European Union publication of the safe harbor
agreement rather than the U.S. version.
6
The European Union adopted the same wording as the U.S. Federal Register, on July
26, 2000. Commission Decision 2000/520/EC Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri
Serv/site/en/oj/2000/l_215/l_21520000825en00070047.pdf [hereinafter Safe Harbor].
7
See infra Part V.
8
See Commission Staff Working Document, The Implementation of Commission Decision 520/2000/EC on the Adequate Protection of Personal Data Provided by the Safe Harbor
Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the US Department of
Commerce SEC (2004) 1323, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/do
cs/adequacy/sec-2004-1323_en.pdf [hereinafter EU Safe Harbor Criticism].
9
Alan Pedersen, US Safe Harbor under fire, PRIVACY LAWS AND BUS. INT’L NEWSL.,
Oct.-Nov. 2004, at 1, 3, available at http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details%5CFile
Upload265%5C912%5CSafe_Harbor_Sotto_11.04.pdf.
10
See infra Part III.C.i.
11
See infra Part V.
12
Currently thirty-eight states have data-breach notifications laws, but only a handful of
those states provide a private right-of-action. See Scott Berinato, Data Breach Notification
Laws, State By State, CSO Disclosure Series, Feb. 12, 2008, http://www.csoonline.com/read/
020108/ammap/ammap.html. See also Posting of Tanya Forsheit to Privacy Law Blog,
Breach Law Data, http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2007/08/articles/security-breachnotification-l/breach-law-data/ (Aug. 3, 2007).
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notify affected EU Citizens. An EU Citizens’ data could be lost or sold and
the end effects would be obvious to the EU Citizen, but it would be impossible to pinpoint the Company that was the source of the data breach. Without knowing which Company was victimized, an EU Citizen would be prevented from utilizing any of the Safe Harbor’s enforcement protections.13
Various U.S. failures to protect privacy, such as the Google-Double
Click merger case study addressed in Part IV, have led to a deterioration of
trust between EU and U.S. enforcement agencies.14 The EU views the U.S.
and Companies as failing to adhere to the intent of the Safe Harbor.15 Nevertheless, it should be of little surprise to EU regulators that Companies and
U.S. agencies do not take the Safe Harbor seriously. The Safe Harbor,
which is self-regulatory in nature, fails to obligate enforcement and establishes oversight in U.S. agencies that are unaccountable to the citizens
whose data flows they are supposed to protect. Together, the Safe Harbor’s
internal enforcement mechanisms and U.S. agency enforcement—through
the FTC—fail to provide the guarantee of a complete investigation, which is
what EU laws secure. In summation, the Safe Harbor is a poor attempt to
reconcile the differences between U.S. and EU privacy regulatory efforts.
This Note proposes several improvements and modifications to the
Safe Harbor. These adjustments will better reconcile EU and U.S. privacy
laws through effective Safe Harbor enforcement mechanisms, while acknowledging and addressing various U.S. law impediments. Therefore, this
Note engages in a statutory analysis that seeks to strengthen the current law
for the benefit of U.S. and EU citizens alike; however, this Note does not
address the far-reaching implications of a “right to privacy.”16 Part II analyzes the differing approaches to privacy regulation between the U.S. and
the EU and suggests that these differences are roadblocks to effective privacy regulation cooperation. Part III explains the details of the Safe Harbor
program and its enforcement mechanisms. Part IV compares the level of
regulatory scrutiny the U.S. and the EU applied to the Google-Double Click
merger and suggests the differing approaches are evidence of the EU’s deteriorating trust in the U.S. privacy self-regulatory scheme. Part V outlines
criticisms of the Safe Harbor’s limited enforcement mechanisms, recommends several solutions, and responds to potential criticisms.

13
See infra Part V.B.4.a (elaborating the data breach example). See also infra Part V.C.2.a
(completing the analysis of the data breach example).
14
See infra Part IV.
15
See EU Safe Harbor Criticism, supra note 8, at 13–14.
16
Scattered throughout this Note are several examples of ends-based implications of a
right to privacy. For example, Part IV addresses some of the real-world consequences of the
Google-DoubleClick merger. See infra Part IV. This Note also discusses the events of data
breaches. See infra Part V.B.4.a. See also Part V.C.2.a.
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DIFFERING APPROACHES TO PRIVACY REGULATION AND
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

U.S. regulation of governmental collection and use of personal data
are confined to the limited categories enumerated in federal statutes.17 U.S.
regulation of private data collection is often called “sectoral” because only a
few federal statutes regulate specific industries in limited circumstances.18
This leaves vast, unregulated gaps in the protection of data collected by
private parties in the U.S.19 What Joel Reidenberg observed in 1995, remains true today:
Despite the growth of the Information Society, the United States has resisted all calls for omnibus or comprehensive legal rules for fair information practice in the private sector. Legal rules have developed on an ad
hoc, targeted basis, while industry has elaborated voluntary norms and
practices for particular problems. Over the years, there has been an almost
zealous adherence to this ideal of narrowly targeted standards.20

The U.S. “sectoral” approach to privacy regulation, therefore, views statutes
as a means to the end of privacy protection. For example, U.S. privacy legislation protecting medical and banking records is a means towards the end
purpose of preventing possible abuse of the information.
In contrast, in the EU, regulation of the use, transfer, and processing
of private data about identifiable persons is covered in sweeping “omnibus”
data statutes.21 EU member states officially recognized the danger of private
data collection as early as 1981.22 More recently, in 1995, the EU enacted
the Data Directive,23 which regulates the exchange and transfer of any private data, including handwritten and oral communications.24 In contrast to
the U.S. “sectoral” approach to privacy, the EU “omnibus” approach to privacy regulation views privacy as an ends with respect to its inherent nature;

17

See 5 U.S.C. § 552A (1974).
Two examples are the medical and credit industries. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681; 12 U.S.C. §§
3401–3422 (1978).
19
CHRISTOPHER WOLF, PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND DATA
SECURITY LAW IN THE INFORMATION AGE 14-3 (Christopher Wolf ed., Practicing Law Institute 2007).
20
Joel Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private
Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 500 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
21
WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-6.
22
See Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. No. 108 (giving individuals the
right to ensure their person data is being used lawfully by private parties).
23
Data Directive, supra note 3.
24
WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-6.
18
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the EU views privacy as a protected state-of-being that is representative of
individual autonomy.25
In the U.S., the vast majority of privacy regulation is enforced
through private civil suits.26 These suits must be initiated, researched, and
litigated all at the expense of the plaintiff. Under the Data Directive, however, member state data protection authorities (Data Protection Authorities)
have direct power to inspect private data processors and begin administrative proceedings against potential violators, which may result in fines or
injunctions.27 Therefore, under the Data Directive, individuals whose privacy may have been violated are not forced to bear a heavy monetary burden
in order to pursue their cases. The Safe Harbor sought to reconcile these
differences.
III. GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM: EU-U.S. DATA PRIVACY SAFE HARBOR
PROGRAM
A.

EU Data Transfers to Non-EU Nations

The Data Directive specifically prohibits sending personal data to
any country without a “level of data protection” considered “adequate” by
EU standards.28 The determination of adequacy of foreign data protection
involves the weighing of several non-exclusive factors, including the nature
of that data, the purpose for processing, the duration of processing, the destination country’s laws on data privacy, and the security measures in place
at the destination country.29 Based on these factors, the EU has designated
only three major non-EU countries’ protections as adequate.30 The EU has
never viewed U.S. privacy law as “adequate” to protect privacy rights because of its piecemeal privacy regulations.31 Initially, EU officials had
hoped to convince U.S. lawmakers to adopt a broad privacy regime similar
25
See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 130 (2007) (“The disclosure of
personal information can severely inhibit a person’s autonomy and self-development.”). See
also, Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52
VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999).
26
See Francesca Bignami, European versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy
Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 684 (2007).
27
See id. at 648.
28
Data Directive, supra note 3, art. 25(1).
29
Id. art. 25(2).
30
The three countries are those of Argentina, Canada, and Switzerland. See European
Commission, Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in
Third Countries, http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/thirdcountries/index_e
n.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
31
See James A. Harvey, Struggle Continues with EU Personal Data Protection Directive,
EUROWATCH, Jan 15, 1999.
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to the Data Directive,32 but this effort failed due to fundamentally differing
conceptions of liberty.33 Since the U.S. was unwilling to pass comprehensive data protection legislation that the EU would view as “adequate,”34
Companies were conflicted. When Companies transferred data to EU member states, they were in violation of the Data Directive. Companies could
not affect the EU opinion of U.S. privacy law adequacy, nor could Companies realistically lobby the U.S. government to implement a broad privacy
regime similar to the Data Directive. Companies instead ignored the Data
Directive and continued to transfer data to EU member states.35 Fortunately
for the Companies, the EU informally suspended Data Directive enforcement against Companies in 1998 and 1999.36
As a solution, the EU allows each Company to serve, in effect, as
its own country with respect to the Data Directive, by committing itself to
one of three options. The first option requires a Company to bind itself to
one of three37 pre-approved contracts that limit data transfers.38 The contracts essentially require the Company to act as if it were under the control
of the Data Directive. The second option allows a Company to adopt binding corporate rules (Binding Corporate Rules).39
Both of the first two methods leave much to be desired. The model
contracts are too simplistic for Companies to use in complicated international transfers.40 The Binding Corporate Rules require a large investment41
and are unlikely to be used because they require Companies to open up their

32

See id.
See generally, Bignami, supra note 26.
34
See Harvey, supra note 31, at 8–9.
35
See id.
36
See id.
37
The EU Commissioner approved three types of contracts in three separate decisions.
Commission Decision 2001/497/EC on Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of
Personal Data to Third Countries, 2001 O.J. (L 181) 19 (regulating controller to controller
data transfers); Commission Decision 2002/16/EC on Standard Contractual Clauses for the
Transfer of Personal Data to Processor Established in Third Countries, 2002 O.J. (L 6) 52
(regulating controller to processor data transfers); Commission Decision 2004/915/EC
Amending Decision 2001/497/EC as Regards the Introduction of an Alternative Set of Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries, 2004 O.J. (L
385) 74 (creating a second contract option for controller to controller data transfers).
38
This option is directly approved by the Data Directive. See Data Directive, supra note 3,
art. 26(4).
39
This option was created by the Data Protection Working Party, which is an advisory
body that was created by article 29 of the Data Directive. See Data Directive, supra note 3,
art. 29.
40
See WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-32.
41
See id.
33
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internal files to routine inspections by EU member states’ Data Protection
Authorities.42
The third option, which is the subject of this Note, is the Safe Harbor. In 1998, the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) and the European
Commission began discussing the creation of a program for Companies to
bind themselves to the Data Directive’s requirements.43 After two years of
negotiations, the DOC and the EU eventually came to an agreement and
created the Safe Harbor. The DOC promulgated a rule44 on July 24, 2000
adopting the Safe Harbor into U.S. law.45 The compromise was ratified by
the EU on July 26, 2000 in a special “decision” that did not require individual EU member state ratification.46
B.

The Safe Harbor

The Safe Harbor is an abnormal regulation that consists of several
separate documents put together as one. The document sections include: (1)
the European Commission’s decision that the Safe Harbor program is “adequate;” (2) a description of seven privacy principle requirements that Companies must follow to fulfill the agreement; (3) fifteen frequently asked
questions and answers that help with statutory interpretation of the seven
privacy principles; (4) a European Commission memorandum on the sufficiency of the FTC’s enforcement powers; (5) a European Commission memorandum on private causes of action for privacy breaches available within
the U.S.; (6) a letter from the FTC to the European Commission clarifying
the agency’s enforcement powers; (7) a letter from the Department of
Transportation to the European Commission clarifying the agency’s enforcement powers; and (8) a list of U.S. agencies the European Commission
has approved to properly enforce the agreement’s requirements.47
42
Applying Article 26(2) of the EU Data Protection Directive to Binding Corporate Rules
for International Data Transfer (EU Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Working Paper
74, June 3, 2003) 16.
43
See Stefano Rodota, OPINION 1/99 Concerning the Level of Data Protection in the
United States and the Ongoing Discussions between the European Commission and the United States Government (Jan. 26, 1999), http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpd
ocs/1999/wp15en.pdf. See also, Harvey, supra note 31. Many documents were sent back and
forth between the EU and the US during the negotiations. See Documents Adopted by the
Data Protection Working Party 1999, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/working
group/wpdocs/1999_en.htm.
44
Rulemaking is procedure under administrative law where a U.S. governmental agency
creates a rule that has the force of law after a notice and comment period. See 5 U.S.C. § 553
(2006). Further discussion on the requirements of rulemaking and administrative law are
beyond the scope of this Note.
45
Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, supra note 5.
46
Safe Harbor, supra note 6.
47
Id.

2009]

EU-U.S. DATA PRIVACY SAFE HARBOR

201

The Safe Harbor is a voluntary48 self-certification system that is
unique to the U.S. and requires Companies to treat data on EU Citizens as if
that data were physically in Europe and subject to the Data Directive.49
1.

Safe Harbor registration

The DOC regulates the self-certification registration of Companies
under the Safe Harbor and maintains a list of all registered Companies,50
including Companies whose membership has lapsed.51 The DOC reviews
both the initial applications for the Safe Harbor and the mandatory annual
renewals.52
To register for the Safe Harbor, a Company simply completes an
online registration form that requires several disclosures, including a description of the Company’s data collecting activities, a list of EU countries
that the Company transfers data to or from, and—most importantly—a description of the Company’s privacy policy.53 A Company’s privacy policy
must incorporate and address all of the Safe Harbor privacy principles.54
The Safe Harbor privacy principles are identical to those of the Data Directive: (1) Notice; (2) Choice; (3) Onward Transfer; (4) Security; (5) Data
Integration; (6) Access; and (7) Enforcement.55
A Company must swear to the accuracy of the online form it submits.56 The online form submission therefore is an affirmative representation of compliance with the Safe Harbor, similar to an affidavit.57 An affirmative representation is critical because the FTC can only “take action
against those who fail to protect the privacy of personal information in accordance with their representations and/or commitments.”58
48

The Safe Harbor is voluntary because companies can choose to use model contracts to
Binding Corporate Rules. See supra Part III.A.
49
Safe Harbor, supra note 6, pmbl.
50
Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor
/SH_Overview.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Safe Harbor Overview].
51
Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor List, http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/shlist.nsf
/webPages/safe+harbor+list/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Safe Harbor List].
52
Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 50.
53
See WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-27. See also Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor
Certification Information, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SH_Cert_Info.asp (last visited
Mar. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Safe Harbor Certification Information].
54
See WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-27.
55
See Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex I.
56
See Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor Documents, FAQ-7 Verification,
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SH_FAQ7.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
57
See WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-27. See also Safe Harbor Certification Information,
supra note 53.
58
Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex III.
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The DOC tests the online privacy policies of registering Companies
“to the greatest extent possible.”59 The DOC, however, admits that when a
Company’s privacy policy is not readily available online, it merely “confirm[s] with the contact point that the policy is available upon request.”60
The DOC rejects approximately fifty-percent of all initial Safe Harbor applications due to deficiencies in at least one area.61
2.

The Safe Harbor Notice, Choice, Onward Transfer, Security, Data
Integration, and Access Principles

The Notice Principle requires a Safe Harbor Company to “inform
individuals about the purposes for which it collects and uses information
about them, how to contact the organization with any inquiries or complaints, [and] the types of third parties to which it discloses the information.”62 This disclosure must occur prior to using collected information and
preferably before individuals are asked to provide personal information.63
The Choice Principle requires a Safe Harbor Company to allow customers to either “opt-in” or “opt-out” of information sharing depending on
the nature of the information. For highly personal information,64 the Choice
Principle requires customers to affirmatively “opt-in” to information sharing
with a third party. For all other types of information, a Company still must
give the customer the choice to “opt-out.”
The Onward Transfer Principle requires a Safe Harbor Company
ensure that either the Safe Harbor or the Data Directive binds any “middleman” third party agent that receives the data at issue.65 Alternatively, the
Company and a “middle-man” agent may sign an agreement incorporating
all of the Safe Harbor principles.66
The Security Principle, although only one sentence in length, is critical to the Safe Harbor. It requires a Company to “take reasonable precau-

59
Damon C. Greer, The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework: Data Protection and Cross
Border Personal Data Transfers, notes accompanying slide 10, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_
home/news/information_dossiers/conference_personal_data/doc/greer.ppt (last visited Mar.
30, 2008) [hereinafter U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework PowerPoint].
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex I.
63
Id.
64
Highly personal information is defined as “personal information specifying medical or
health conditions, racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs,
trade union membership or information specifying the sex life of the individual.” Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
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tions to protect [all data] from loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and destruction.”67
The Data Integration Principle requires a Safe Harbor Company to
process data only in a manner compatible with “the purposes for which it
has been collected or subsequently authorized by the individual.”68 Additionally, a Safe Harbor Company must ensure that all data collected is “reliable for its intended use, accurate, complete, and current.”69
The Access Principle requires a Company registered with the Safe
Harbor to make its files available upon request to any EU Citizen the Company has collected information about. An EU Citizen may request to view,
correct and amend his or her information in the Company’s files.70 A Company may charge a reasonable fee for providing access.71 There are several
exceptions to the Access Principle,72 but they are beyond the scope of this
Note and will not be discussed here.
3.

The Safe Harbor Enforcement Principle

For the purposes of this Note, the most important provision is the
Enforcement Principle. At its basic level, the Enforcement Principle has
three components: (1) a resolution system using an “independent recourse
mechanism;” (2) a privacy policy verification mechanism; and (3) a guarantee to remedy.73 The first component, the “independent recourse mechanism,” must be “readily available and affordable” to a potential complainant.74 Second, a Company must have a verification mechanism that shows
all privacy practice assertions are true and implemented.75 Finally, a Company must obligate itself to resolve any issues that arise from a determination made by the “independent recourse mechanism.”76
a.

The Enforcement Principle’s independent recourse mechanism requirement

The Enforcement Principle’s “independent recourse mechanism” is
likely a result of EU concessions to DOC negotiators. The “independent
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex I.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. annex II.
Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II.
Id. annex I.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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recourse mechanism” parallels other U.S. privacy laws that exclusively remedy violations through civil suits.77 As its name implies, an “independent
recourse mechanism” uses private-sector organizations to help Companies
“self-regulate” their data collection and uses.
The Enforcement Principle allows Companies to use one of four
types of “independent recourse mechanisms.”78 First, several private-sector
privacy programs are available which meet the Safe Harbor requirements79
such as BBBOnline80 or TRUSTe.81 Second, a Company can commit to
cooperate with the EU member states’ Data Protection Authority.82 Third,
Companies may seek out other private sector “independent recourse mechanism” bodies that “meet the requirements of the Enforcement Principle
and the FAQs.”83 Finally, the Safe Harbor allows Companies to “compl[y]
with legal or regulatory supervisory authorities that provide for handling of
individual complaints and dispute resolution.”84 While at least one leading
authority on privacy law ignores this option,85 some Companies interpret
this language to include a Company’s own internal complaint process as an
“independent recourse mechanism.”86
b.

The Enforcement Principle’s Verification Requirement

The Enforcement Principle’s Verification Requirement obligates
Companies to verify that their stated privacy practices are implemented.87 A
Company registering for the Safe Harbor can verify its privacy policies in
one of two ways. The first option allows a Company to submit to annual
77

See Bignami, supra note 26, at 684.
Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II.
79
See id.
80
See US Better Business Bureau, EU Safe Harbor, http://www.bbbonline.org/privacy/e
u.asp (last visited Aug. 30, 2008) (describing BBBOnline’s self-regulatory Safe Harbor
compliance program).
81
See TRUSTe, http://www.truste.org/businesses/eu_safe_harbor_seal.php (last visited
Aug. 30, 2008) (describing TRUSTe’s self-regulatory Safe Harbor compliance program).
82
Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
See WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-26.
86
See, e.g., Safe Harbor Registration of Adaptec, Inc., http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor
/shlist.nsf/5624e34187d9c4dc85256960005fc648/b0893a8186c1fd0885256b7200572945?Op
enDocument (last visited Mar. 30, 2008) (listing its “independent recourse mechanism” as
“Consumer or Adaptec employee complaints will generally be escalated internally to the
Adaptec corporate legal department which will consult with management on appropriate
response or action depending on the facts at issue”). Only after going through Adaptec’s
process unsuccessfully will they refer the matter to a Data Protection Authority. This troubling interpretation is discussed in Part V of this Note. See infra Part V.B.1.b.iii.
87
Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II.
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outside compliance reviews.88 Additionally, the Safe Harbor suggests that
Companies submit themselves to “without limitation auditing, random reviews, [and] use of ‘decoys.’”89 The other option allows a Company to
“self-verify.” Under this option, a Company must merely submit an annual
written verification—signed by a corporate officer or authorized representative—stating that the Company’s published privacy policy is “accurate,
comprehensive, prominently displayed, completely implemented and accessible.”90 Additionally, the “self-verification” document must list internal
procedures for periodically conducting objective reviews of compliance
with the Safe Harbor.91
c.

The Enforcement Principle’s Guarantee to Remedy Requirement

The Enforcement Principle’s Guarantee to Remedy Requirement is
usually satisfied through a Company’s “independent recourse mechanism.”
When a Company’s chosen “independent recourse mechanism” determines
there is a violation, the Safe Harbor suggests several remedies of varying
degree based on the level of the violation.92 At a minimum, any remedy
should reverse the effects of the violation, ensure future processing complies with the Safe Harbor Principles and publish the non-compliance findings.93 Any “independent recourse mechanism,” however, must notify both
the DOC and the governmental body with applicable jurisdiction—usually
the FTC—if a Company fails to comply with the procedures and remedies
demanded by its “independent recourse mechanism.”94 The Safe Harbor
suggests “independent recourse mechanism” bodies use further sanctions,
such as, stopping the processing of the complainant’s personal data, deleting
the data at issue, removing an “independent recourse mechanism[’]s” privacy program seal, and compensating a complainant for any losses incurred.95
The Enforcement Principle’s self-regulatory means of enforcement
through an “independent recourse mechanism,” verification, and a guarantee to remedy, however, is only one part of the Safe Harbor’s overall enforcement scheme.96
88

Id.
Id.
90
Id.
91
See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing how “self-verification” is contrary to the intent of the
Safe Harbor).
92
Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
See infra Part III.C.2.a (explaining the “big picture” of the Safe Harbor “layer” method
of enforcement).
89
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Data Directive enforcement in the EU
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The Data Directive requires enforcement solely through a government agency.97Accordingly, each EU member state is required to create a
Data Protection Authority.98 The Data Protection Authority is a government
agency whose sole responsibility is to protect privacy through the enforcement of the Data Directive and other data protection laws.99 Some EU
member states’ Data Protection Authorities require all data collectors and
processors to file annual reports.100 For example, France’s Data Protection
Authority goes so far to require data collectors and processors to be approved prior to beginning operations.101 The Data Protection Authorities are
required to be proactive, self-initiate an investigation, and enforce possible
or potential violations in data processing operations.102 Under the Data Directive EU Citizens must be given the right to object to their data being
processed and a data processor must have an objection process that does not
charge a fee.103 Additionally, EU Citizens can initiate private rights of action,104 and Data Protection Authorities give prior privacy adjudications a
res judicata effect when litigating new cases.105
2.

Safe Harbor Enforcement in the United States

a.

Safe Harbor enforcement—the big picture

Enforcement under the Safe Harbor follows a multiple “layer” approach. The Enforcement Principle106 only encompasses one “layer” of the
Safe Harbor’s means of enforcement. The first enforcement “layer” is the
initial Safe Harbor registration and subsequent annual Safe Harbor registration renewals, run by the DOC.107 The second “layer” is the Enforcement
Principle’s “independent recourse mechanism.”108 The final “layer” is government intervention, usually through the FTC.
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

Data Directive, supra note 3, art. 28.
Id. art. 28(1).
See id. art. 28(1).
The Data Directive requires annual reports. Data Directive, supra note 3, arts. 18–19.
WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-14.
See Data Directive, supra note 3, art. 20. See also id. art. 28.
Id. art. 14.
Id. art. 22–24.
See id. art. 28(5).
See supra Part III.B.3.
See supra Part III.B.1.
See supra Part III.B.3.a.
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To resolve a complaint, an EU Citizen should first directly contact a
Company. Second, he or she could seek recourse through the Enforcement
Principle by referencing the Company’s privacy policy and contacting the
Company’s “independent recourse mechanism.” Finally, if a Company fails
to fulfill the remedy, if any, demanded by its “independent recourse mechanism,” then the “independent recourse mechanism” must refer the matter
to the U.S. governmental agency that has jurisdiction over the Company,
usually the FTC.109 The last “layer,” U.S. agency enforcement, is discussed
in the next section.
b.

U.S. Agency Safe Harbor enforcement

As part of each Company’s initial registration for the Safe Harbor
with the DOC, each Company must state which “[s]pecific statutory body
. . . has jurisdiction to hear any claims against the organization regarding
possible unfair or deceptive practices and violations of laws or regulations
governing privacy.”110 Since the inception of the Safe Harbor, only two
government agencies have assured the European Commission that they will
take enforcement actions against Companies that fail to abide by their Safe
Harbor commitments.111 The two agencies are the FTC and the Department
of Transportation.112
This Note will discuss the FTC’s effectiveness under the Safe Harbor in light of its broad authority to regulate any “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce”113 under the Federal Trade Commission
Act (FTC Act).114 In contrast, the Department of Transportation’s authority
is limited to the much smaller subset of common carrier issues, and thus the
Department of Transportation’s enforcement authority will not be discussed
in this Note.
The FTC can only initiate action against companies that have first
made a representation.115 Therefore, as previously discussed,116 A Company’s Safe Harbor registration acts as an affirmative representation by a

109

See Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II.
Safe Harbor Certification Information, supra note 53.
111
See Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 50.
112
Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex VII.
113
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
114
15 U.S.C §§ 41–58 (2006).
115
See Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex III. (“[T]he Federal Trade Commission … [can
only] take action against those who fail to protect the privacy of personal information in
accordance with their representations and/or commitments.”) (emphasis added).
116
See supra Part III.B.1.
110
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Company, similar to an affidavit.117 If a Company fails to comply with its
Safe Harbor commitment, then the FTC has the power to prosecute the false
representation as a deceptive action.118
The FTC can seek several types of remedies on behalf of consumers. After conducting a formal hearing, the FTC may issue a cease and desist order,119 seek restraining orders or injunctions,120 and—in more severe
cases—may promulgate an administrative rule barring an act or practice as
per se unfair or deceptive.121 The FTC may fine a Company up to $10,000
for each failure to comply with a FTC order122 or for violating a FTC rule.123
IV. THE GOOGLE-DOUBLE CLICK MERGER: A CASE STUDY IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION’S DETERIORATING TRUST IN THE U.S. PRIVACY
REGULATORY SCHEME
EU member states and their citizens are forced to rely on Safe Harbor enforcement “layer” entities that are outside the realm of EU political
control. Neither the “independent recourse mechanisms” nor U.S. agencies,
such as the FTC, have any incentive to pursue Safe Harbor violation claims
because both “independent recourse mechanisms” and the FTC are unaccountable to EU Citizens. It is as if the EU decided to rely on an unpaid
mercenary force to protect its data “borders” with the U.S. Therefore, EU
Citizens have no choice but to rely on Safe Harbor enforcement bodies that
are politically unaccountable to them, have little incentive to pursue claims,
and have taken little action over the seven-year period since the Safe Harbor’s inception.124
This is not a small problem. In 2004, the U.S. and its top six European trade partners traded approximately $400 billion in goods and services.125 It is likely that Companies hold some of EU Citizens’ most vulnerable
data,126 yet that data resides where there is poor enforcement, and little in117

See WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-27. See also Safe Harbor Certification Information,
supra note 53.
118
See Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex III.
119
15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2006).
120
15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2006).
121
15 U.S.C. § 57a(1)(B) (2006).
122
15 U.S.C. § 45(k)(1) (2006).
123
15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1) (2006).
124
See infra Part V.
125
U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework PowerPoint, supra note 59, at slide 3.
126
The Safe Harbor program includes the registration of over 1600 companies. Safe Harbor
List, supra note 51. The business sectors of those companies include market research firms,
such as Harris Interactive Inc., and large internet retailers, such as Amazon.com, Inc. Id.
(follow links to specific companies listed alphabetically).
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centive to invest in protecting the data.127 Many EU Citizens question the
effectiveness of the U.S. self-regulatory model of privacy regulation and
enforcement. The deteriorating trust makes it all the more important for
citizens of EU member states to have their confidence reassured by strengthened Safe Harbor enforcement mechanisms.128 This section explores the
different approaches used by the EU Commission on Competition and FTC
Bureau of Competition for regulating Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick,
an online advertising company. This example demonstrates the EU’s fading
confidence in the U.S. self-regulatory model of privacy regulation and enforcement.129
A.

Google’s Significant Collected Data

In August, 2007, 210 million individuals in Europe made 18 billion
search requests on the Google search engine.130 Google “obsessively files
away most every scrap of data it receives,”131 but Google recently enacted a
policy to “remov[e] identifying data from its search logs after 18 months to
two years” and that after eighteen months, the information it collects does
not include the personal identity of a user.132 While this is technically true,
with an average of 86 search inquiries per European citizen in August of
2007 it is not difficult to put separate search patterns together to identify a
unique individual.133 The longer Google retains data on a person, the more
“complete” a picture both Google, and potential data thieves, have about a

127

See infra Part V.
See id.
129
Notice that some of the issues raised by the EU over Google’s policies involve additional EU privacy directives that were passed subsequent to the Data Directive. This Note does
not discuss the specific legal sections or arguments because they are beyond the scope of this
Note.
130
Richard Holt, Google Powers Half the World’s Web Searches, TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Nov.
10, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/connected/main.jhtml?xml=/connected/2007/10/11/
dlgoogle111.xml.
131
Posting of Saul Hansell to N.Y. Times Bits Blog, As Ask Erases Little, Google and
Others Keep Writing About You, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/12/12/as-ask-eraseslittle-google-and-others-keep-writing-about-you (Dec. 12, 2007, 12:44 EST).
132
Posting of Ryan Singel to Wired Threat Level Blog, Google to Anonymize Data,
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/03/google_to_anony.html (Mar. 14, 2007, 15:45
EST).
133
For example, the same person may make the following searches: “Fish and chips in
Cotswolds,” “Ancestry of sir name Clarkson,” “Ferrari F430,” “Chipping Norton noise pollution laws.” Alone, the searches may mean little. Together, they can pinpoint a specific person, in this case, Jeremy Clarkson, a presenter on BBC Two’s “Top Gear” television program.
128
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person. Google’s goal in retaining consumer data is simple: to gain a unique
understanding of its users to target advertising.134
B.

Initial European Union Concerns with Google’s Data Retention
Practices

As early as April, 2004, the EU began to raise concerns over
Google’s data retention practices.135 In May, 2007, the Article 29 Working
Party136 sent an official letter137 to Google, asking for an explanation of why
it keeps user data for two full years.138 In June 2007, Peter Fleischer,
Google’s Chief Privacy Counsel, responded that Google would reduce its
data retention to eighteen months.139 Mr. Fleischer argued that data retention
serves as an “important tool for law enforcement to investigate and prosecute many serious crimes, such as child exploitation” and he “firmly reject[ed] any suggestions that [Google] could meet [its] legitimate interests
in security, innovation and anti-fraud efforts with any retention period
shorter than 18 months.”140 Some observers believe that Google is using law
enforcement and national security concerns as a cover-up for its actual intentions of targeting advertising.141 In an October 2007 reply, the Article 29
Working Party acknowledged that that Mr. Fleischer had “raised several
issues about processing [] personal data” with regard to search engines and
that the group would release an opinion on these issues “in early 2008.”142
134

See Posting of Saul Hansell, supra note 131.
Posting of Mike Masnick to Tech Dirt Blog, Does Gmail Break The Law?,
http://techdirt.com/articles/20040405/1033231.shtml (Apr. 5, 2004, 10:34 EST).
136
This group, created by Data Directive article 29, is composed of national officials that
advise the EU on privacy policy. Data Directive, supra note 3, art. 29.
137
Letter from Peter Schaar, Chairman of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, to
Peter Fleischer, Privacy Counsel to Google (May 16, 2007), http://ec.europa.eu/justice_ho
me/fsj/privacy/news/docs/pr_google_16_05_07_en.pdf.
138
Maija Palmer, EU Probes Google Grip on Data, FINANCIAL TIMES, May 24, 2007,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/dc89ec96-0a24-11dc-93ae-000b5df10621.html.
139
Letter from Peter Fleischer, Global Privacy Counsel to Google, to Peter Schaar, Chairman of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (June 10, 2007),
http://64.233.179.110/blog_resources/Google_response_Working_Party_06_2007.pdf.
140
Id.
141
See, e.g., Posting of Joe Weisenthal to Tech Dirt Blog, Is Google Making Up Fake Laws
In Order To Cover For Its Retention Policies?, http://techdirt.com/articles/20070712/1119
43.shtml (July 12, 2007, 16:44 EST); Posting of Ryan Singel to Wired Threat Level Blog,
Google Still Using E.U. Data Retention Ruse to Justify Massive Data Collection,
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/07/google-still-us.html (July 12, 2007, 12:46 EST).
142
Letter from Peter Schaar, Chairman of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, to
Peter Fleischer, Global Privacy Counsel to Google (Oct. 12, 2007),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/others/2007_10_12_reply_to_goog
le_en.pdf.
135
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The Google-DoubleClick Merger

In April 2007, Google bought the online advertising firm DoubleClick for $3.1 billion dollars, its largest acquisition to date.143 Google and
DoubleClick both advertise online, but with slightly different specialties.
Google’s advertising division, AdSense, helps display advertising directly
on a website, which generates revenue for the website owners. Google
crawls144 the content of the page on which the ad is to be displayed, and
AdSense generates advertising for various companies that the website’s
visitors would likely be interested in.145 DoubleClick, however, supplies
various advertisers and website publishers with elaborate plans for the delivery, management and reporting of web-displayed ads.146 It uses “Web surfers’ interaction with ads to determine how to place the most effective display ads.”147 DoubleClick’s approach to advertising is called “behavioral
advertising.” The primary difference is that Google’s AdSense ads are
usually text only and relate to the contents of the page on which the ads
appear;148 DoubleClick’s advertisements, in contrast, are usually large image or video banners and are directed to an audience based on prior user
viewing habits.149
1.

The Federal Trade Commission investigation

The Google purchase of DoubleClick raised the ire of several privacy groups because “DoubleClick and Google [could] combine some of their
huge databases of information on Internet use.”150 On April 20, 2007, three
privacy advocacy groups—the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the
Center for Digital Democracy, and the U.S. Public Interest Research
Group—filed a joint complaint with the FTC alleging that the merger would

143
Louise Story, Google Buys an Online Ad Firm for $3.1 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,
2007, at C1.
144
This is a term for when a search engine visits a website and creates a “snapshot” of
website’s content.
145
Google, Welcome to AdSense, https://www.google.com/adsense/ (last visited Aug. 30,
2008).
146
See DoubleClick, What We Do, http://www.doubleclick.com/about/what_we_do.aspx
(last visited Aug. 30, 2008).
147
Story, supra note 143.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id. (“You can dive deep into that data and say who were those people, where do they
live, what were they doing when they looked at those ads?”).
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give Google access “to more information about the Internet activities of
consumers than any other company in the world.”151
Despite the privacy groups’ concerns, mergers and acquisitions are
evaluated under anti-trust law. Both the FTC Bureau of Competition and the
Department of Justice can review anti-trust allegations. The FTC Bureau of
Competition was selected to review the Google-DoubleClick merger in late
May 2007.152 This was a significant and favorable development for the privacy groups because although “[c]onsumer protection issues are not considered as factors in whether the Department of Justice or the FTC Bureau of
Competition is chosen to review a merger,” once the FTC Bureau of Competition is selected, it can take account of possible violations of section five
of the FTC Act.153
Adding to the controversy, politicians and a newspaper editorial
raised privacy concerns about the merger. On June 13, 2007, the New York
Times featured an editorial calling on the FTC to address the privacy implications of the merger, in addition to the anti-trust implications.154 The editorial stated that “[p]rivacy is too important to leave up to the companies
that benefit financially from collecting and retaining data.”155 The editorial
forewarned that Google's acquisition of DoubleClick could mean that the
post-merger Google “could track more sensitive information—like what
diseases users have, or what political causes they support.” 156
In September 2007, during a U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee
meeting on the merger, Senator Herbert Kohl stated that he believes the
Committee should consider the privacy implications of the merger, in opposition the beliefs of some anti-trust regulators.157 Sen. Kohl continued, say151

Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief,
Google, Inc. and DoubleClick, Inc. (FTC 2007), http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/epic_com
plaint.pdf. The groups subsequently filed supplements in June and September. Supplemental
Materials in Support of Pending Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief, Google, Inc. and DoubleClick, Inc. (FTC 2007),
http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/supp_060607.pdf; Second Filing of Supplemental Materials in Support of Pending Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation
and for Other Relief, Google, Inc. and DoubleClick, Inc. (FTC 2007),
http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/supp2_091707.pdf.
152
Steve Lohr, Google Deal Said to Bring U.S. Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2007, at C1.
153
Posting of Ari Schwartz to Center for Democracy and Technology PolicyBeta Blog,
FTC Should Address Google-DoubleClick Privacy Issues, http://blog.cdt.org/2007/05/29/ftcshould-address-google-doubleclick-privacy-issues/ (May 29, 2007).
154
Editorial, Watching Your Every Move, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2007, at A20.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
An Examination of the Google-DoubleClick Merger and the Online Advertising Industry: What Are the Risks for Competition and Privacy?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. (2007) (statement of Sen. Herbert Kohl), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hear
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ing that the anti-trust laws were written for the purpose of limiting “undue
concentrations of economic power for our society as a whole, and not just
merely their effects on consumers’ pocketbooks.”158 At the same meeting,
Senator Patrick Leahy supplemented the statements of Sen. Kohl. Sen.
Leahy said that “Most online users are unaware of how and when information about their online activity is being used,” and companies that collect
personal data “have an obligation to safeguard such data.”159
Google responded to the concerns of politicians and privacy groups
at the same U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee meeting. David Drummond,
Google’s Senior Vice President for Corporate Development and Chief Legal
Officer, spoke on Google’s behalf. In his testimony, Mr. Drummond argued
that competition is what keeps Google’s privacy practices in line, stating
that “[u]ser interests effectively regulate our behavior.”160 Google subsequently published several documents on its public policy blog,161 including
talking points on the merger162 and quotes from various sources that have
commented positively about Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick.163
During the FTC Bureau of Competition’s investigation of the
Google-DoubleClick merger, an officer in the FTC Bureau of Competition
itself became a target of the same privacy groups that filed the original
complaint. On December 12, 2007, the privacy groups called for FTC
Chairperson Deborah Platt Majoras to recuse herself164 because her husband, John Majoras, works as a partner in the anti-trust section of the Jones
Day law firm—a firm that represents DoubleClick in international matings/hearing.cfm?id=2955.
158
Id.
159
Id. (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
160
Id. (statement of David Drummond, Senior Vice President of Corporate Development
and Chief Legal Officer, Google).
161
Google Public Policy Blog, http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/ (last visited Aug.
30, 2008).
162
Google, Google-DoubleClick Acquisition Background Information, http://services.goo
gle.com/blog_resources/google_doubleclick_background.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
163
Google, What People Are Saying About the Google-DoubleClick Acquisition,
http://64.233.179.110/blog_resources/what_people_are_saying.pdf (last visited Sept. 30,
2007).
164
Complaint Requesting Recusal of the Federal Trade Commission Chairman from the
Pending Review of the Proposed Google-DoubleClick Merger, Google, Inc. and DoubleClick, Inc. (FTC 2007), http://www.epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/recusal_121207.pdf. See also
Donald S. Clark, Federal Trade Commission Secretary, letter to EPIC Executive Director
Marc Rotenberg (Dec. 14, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/12/071214letter.pdf; Consumer
Groups Seek Recusal of FTC Head, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Dec. 12, 2007),
http://www.fool.com/news/associated-press/2007/12/12/consumer-groups-seek-recusal-offtc-head.aspx; Groups say FTC, law firm hiding DoubleClick conflict, Breaking Legal News
Blog, Dec. 14, 2007, http://www.breakinglegalnews.com/entry/Groups-say-FTC-law-firmhiding-DoubleClick-conflict/.
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ters.165 Ms. Majoras nevertheless refused to recuse herself, stating that her
husband has no financial interest in the outcome of the merger regulator
decision because he is no longer an equity partner at Jones Day, and therefore she has no conflict of interest.166
On December 21, 2007, the FTC Bureau of Competition approved
the merger of Google and DoubleClick, without condition, in a 4–1 opinion.167 The FTC Bureau of Competition ignored privacy concerns, stating
that Google is only a small part of the online advertising world and privacy
issues “extend to the entire online advertising marketplace.”168 The majority
opinion of the FTC Bureau of Competition stated that it “lack[ed] legal authority to require conditions to this merger that do not relate to antitrust,
[and] regulating the privacy requirements of just one company could itself
pose a serious detriment to competition in this vast and rapidly evolving
industry.”169 The decision lacked any substantive analysis of the privacy
issues at stake, and in three short sentences dismissed all privacy concerns:
We investigated the possibility that this transaction could adversely affect
non-price attributes of competition, such as consumer privacy. We have
concluded that the evidence does not support a conclusion that it would do
so. We have therefore concluded that privacy considerations, as such, do
not provide a basis to challenge this transaction.170

FTC Commissioner Jon Leibowitz issued a concurring statement that addressed the privacy concerns more directly.171 Mr. Leibowitz stated that
“industry participants must stop being coy and start being more forthcoming
about their practices, the consumer information they collect, and how they
165

Jones Day, Professional Biography: John M. Majoras, http://www.jonesday.com/jmm
ajoras/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
166
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras Concerning Petition Seeking My Recusal from Review of Proposed Acquisition of Hellman & Friedman
Capital Partners V, LP (DoubleClick Inc.) by Google, Inc., Dec. 14, 2007,
http://ftc.gov/opa/2007/12/google.shtm. See also Regulator Won’t Step Aside in Google
Review, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/15/technology/15go
ogle.html.
167
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal Trade Commission Close
Google/DoubleClick Investigation (Dec. 20, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/12/google
dc.shtm. See also Louise Story, F.T.C. Approves DoubleClick Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/21/business/21adco.html.
168
FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC FILE NO. 071-0170, STATEMENT OF FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION CONCERNING GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK at 2, http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710
170/071220statement.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
169
Id.
170
Id. at 2–3.
171
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC FILE NO. 071-0170, CONCURRING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER JON LIEBOWITZ IN THE MATTER OF GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220leib.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
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use it.”172 Mr. Leibowitz recommended two actions. First, he said that the
FTC should use its power to subpoena information from Companies that
have large troves of data when they are not forthcoming with how they use
the data.173 Second, the FTC should require that consumers must “opt-in” to
receive targeted advertising.174
FTC Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour was the lone dissent.
Ms. Harbour stated that the FTC Bureau of Competition closed its investigation too soon to address all competition and privacy issues.175 She condemned the FTC’s failure to follow its dual role for protecting against both
consumer violations and anti-trust violations. She stated that “the Commission could have utilized the full scope of its statutory powers to ensure
competition was not harmed, while also addressing the privacy issues.”176
Commissioner Harbour directly addressed the privacy advocates’
concerns and stated that she was “uncomfortable accepting the merging
parties nonbinding representations at face value. . . . The merger creates a
firm with vast knowledge of consumer preferences, subject to very little
accountability.”177 She added that there is a “disconnect between the financial incentives of advertisers and publishers (i.e., to exploit data) and the
privacy incentives of some consumers (i.e., to protect data).”178 Finally,
Commissioner Harbour suggested that the U.S. Congress should consider
“whether comprehensive privacy legislation (including, but not limited to,
behavioral advertising) is needed.” 179
Google and its opponents reacted as expected. Google hailed the
ruling stating that it “firmly believe[s] the transaction will increase competition and bring substantial benefits to consumers, web publishers, and online
advertisers.”180 The Electronic Privacy Information Center condemned the
ruling, stating it was a mistake for the Commissioners “to ignore the privacy
172

Id at 2.
See id. at 2 n.3.
174
See id. at 3.
175
FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC FILE NO. 071-0170, DISSENTING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER PAMELA HARBOUR IN THE MATTER OF GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220harbour.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2008) (“If
the Commission closes its investigation at this time, without imposing any conditions on the
merger, neither the competition nor the privacy interests of consumers will have been adequately addressed.”).
176
Id. at 13.
177
Id. at 9–10 (emphasis added).
178
Id. at 11–12.
179
Id. at 12.
180
Posting of David Drummond to Google Public Policy Blog, Analysis: The FTC Clears
Our Acquisition of DoubleClick, http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2007/12/analysisftc-clears-our-acquisition-of.html (Dec. 20, 2007, 13:49 PST).
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implications of the Google-DoubleClick merger and to propose instead the
same self-regulatory approach to privacy protection that has repeatedly
failed American consumers.”181
2.

European Union Investigation

Google also had to pass an investigation by the EU Commission on
Competition to complete its acquisition of DoubleClick. On September 21,
2007, Google applied to the EU Commission on Competition for permission
to merge with DoubleClick.182 Yet before receiving Google’s official application, the EU Commission on Competition took the “unusual step of sending questionnaires to Google customers before the company officially”
sought permission to acquire DoubleClick.183
Early in the EU Commission on Competition’s investigation,
Google’s chances of acquiring DoubleClick appeared grim. In June 2007,
long before Google filed its merger application, a European consumer
group, BEUC, petitioned the Commission to prevent the merger.184 Later, in
late September 2007, the Data Protection Commissioner of the German federal state of Schleswig-Holstein sent a letter, to the EU Commission on
Competition recommending the agency reject the merger.185 In the letter, the
German Data Protection Commissioner stated that it had to assume that in
the event of a takeover of DoubleClick the databases of that company will
be integrated into those of Google, with the result that fundamental provisions of the European Data Protection Directive will be violated.186 The
German Data Protection Commissioner also stated that if the merger occurred, a wealth of user data and detailed individual profiles would be
created without the knowledge of the individuals concerned, and individuals

181

Press Release, Marc Rotenberg, Statement Regarding the Majority Opinion of the Federal Trade Commission in Proposed Acquisition of Doubleclick (Dec. 20, 2007),
http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/EPIC_statement122007.pdf.
182
Procedures Relating to the Implementation of the Competition Policy 2007 O.J. (C 230)
12, Oct. 2, 2007, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:230
:0012:0012:EN:PDF.
183
EU Questions Google Customers Over DoubleClick, REUTERS, Sept. 6, 2007,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUKBRU00592120070906.
184
Letter from Jim Murray et al., BEUC Directors, to Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner (June 27, 2007), http://docshare.beuc.org/Common/GetFile.asp?ID=23759&mfd=of
f&LogonName=Guesten.
185
Schreiben des Leiters des ULD Dr. Thilo Weichert an die Kommissarin der Europaischen Kommission Neelie Kroes zum Wettbewerbsverfahren ween der Ubernahme des Internet Werbeyermarkters DoubleClick durch Google [Letter from Dr. Thilo Weichert, the Head
of the ULD, to Commissioner Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner] (Sept. 26, 2007),
https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/suchmaschinen/20070926-doubleclick-google.html.
186
Id.
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would be without the ability to assert their rights.187 Finally, the German
Data Protection Commissioner stated that it was of no significance that both
Google and DoubleClick are members of the Safe Harbor188 because the
merging of data and the evaluation and the use of personalized advertising
takes place in the U.S., and data merging is specifically against the European data protection directive.189
Google fought back in October 2007 by promising to “keep certain
DoubleClick business practices unchanged,”190 meaning that Google would
segregate its own AdSense advertising division from the newly acquired
DoubleClick. The EU Commission on Competition announced on November 13, 2007 that it would prefer to have the issue debated further and
opened an in-depth investigation,191 postponing a decision to April 2,
2008.192 Nevertheless, Google remained confident following its merger approval in the U.S. and hoped that the EU Commission on Competition
would follow suit.193
On March 11, 2008, the EU Commission on Competition approved
the Google-DoubleClick merger.194 Similar to the FTC Bureau of Competition’s anti-trust analysis, the EU Commission on Competition did not evaluate or take into account the privacy implications of the merger.195 The
187

Id.
Google Privacy Center: Privacy Policy, http://www.google.co.uk/privacypolicy.html
(last visited Aug. 30, 2008) (“Google adheres to the US Safe Harbor Privacy Principles of
Notice, Choice, Onward Transfer, Security, Data Integrity, Access and Enforcement and is
registered with the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Safe Harbor Programme.”); DoubleClick Privacy: Europe/Safe Harbor, http://www.doubleclick.com/privacy/europe.aspx (last
visited Aug. 30, 2008).
189
Letter from Dr. Thilo Weichert, supra note 185.
190
Victoria Shannon, Google Hits European Hurdle on DoubleClick Deal, The New York
Times (Nov. 14, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/technology/14google.html.
191
Press Release, European Commission, European Commission opens in-depth investigation into Google’s proposed take over of DoubleClick (Nov. 13, 2007),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1688&format=HTML&aged
=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
192
European Commission Competition Cases from 4700-4749, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
competition/mergers/cases/index/m94.html#m_4731 (last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (listing the
provisional deadline of the deadline of the Google/DoubleClick case as Apr. 2, 2008).
193
See Google Focuses on EU Review, THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 21, 2007, at C3.
194
Press Release, European Commission on Competition, Mergers: Commission Clears
Proposed Acquisition of DoubleClick by Google (Mar. 11, 2008), http://europa.eu/rapid/p
ressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/426&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gui
Language=en. The European Commission has also made the full text available. Commission
Regulation 139/2004, 2008 O.J. (C 184) 10, http://ec.europa.eu/com
m/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4731_20080311_20682_en.pdf.
195
See Associated Press, Europe Clears Google DoubleClick Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/11/technology/apee-google.html (“Regulators said
their decision was based exclusively on the economic aspects of the deal and it had no bear188
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European Commission on Competition stated that the “decision to clear the
proposed merger is based exclusively on its appraisal under the EU Merger
Regulation.”196 The European Commission on Competition stressed that its
decision was “without prejudice to the merged entity’s obligations under
EU legislation in relation to the protection of individuals and the protection
of privacy with regard to the processing of personal data.”197
D.

Future EU Regulation of Google, Search Engines, and Behavioral
Advertising

Although Google cleared all anti-trust regulatory bodies in the U.S.
and Europe, Google still will face other EU governmental bodies that will
continue to scrutinize its privacy practices, now that it has acquired DoubleClick. For example, on January 21, 2008, the European Parliament conducted a formal hearing entitled “Data protection on the Internet” that primarily focused on the proposed Google-DoubleClick merger.198 Interestingly, Ms. Pamela Harbour, the lone dissent in the FTC Bureau of Competition’s ruling on the Google-DoubleClick merger,199 testified on behalf of the
FTC at the European Parliament hearing.200 At the hearing, Peter Schaar,
head of Germany’s Data Protection Authority, made the significant assertion that internet protocol addresses (IP addresses)201 should be treated as
personal information.202 If later EU interpretations of the Data Directive
hold that IP addresses are personal information, it would mean that Google,
ing on the companies’ obligations under E.U. personal privacy protection rules or how personal data is processed.”).
196
Press Release, European Commission on Competition, supra note 194.
197
Id.
198
European Parliament, Jan. 21, 2008, Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee, Hearing regarding Data protection on the internet: Google-Doubleclick and other case
studies, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/hearingsCom.do
?language=EN&body=LIBE. The program for the entire hearing is available online. European Parliament, Jan. 21, 2008, Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee, Hearing regarding Data protection on the internet: Google-Doubleclick and other case studies,
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200801/20080117AT
T19091/20080117ATT19091EN.pdf [hereinafter European Parliament, Google-Doubleclick
entire hearing program].
199
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 175.
200
European Parliament, Google-Doubleclick entire hearing program, supra note 198.
201
An IP address is a unique number that identifies each computer on the internet. An IP
address can reveal the city and country a person is physically located in and which internet
service provider a person is using. Posting of Saul Hansell to N.Y. Times Bits Blog, Europe:
Your I.P. Address Is Personal, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/22/europe-your-ipaddress-is-personal/ (Jan. 22, 2008, 15:31 EST).
202
Aoife White, IP Addresses Are Personal Data, E.U. Regulator Says, WASH. POST, Jan.
22, 2008, at D1.
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along with all other search engines and online providers, would have to
comply with Data Directive before collecting data on web surfing habits.203
Google argues that IP addresses are not personally identifiable information
because IP addresses only identify a computer and not the person using it.204
The Article 29 Working Party expects to release a report in April 2008 on
the application of the Data Directive to search engine data retention and
targeted advertising, resolving the issue over IP addresses.205 The report will
refine a November 2006 resolution, passed at a conference of Data Protection Authorities, which briefly analyzed the privacy issues of search engines
and behavioral advertising.206
E.

Significance of European Union and Federal Trade Commission
Differences

The EU applied a much higher level of scrutiny when reviewing the
Google-DoubleClick merger. The EU Commission on Competition initiated
a longer and more in-depth investigation than the FTC Bureau of Competition’s investigation,207 after early public attention.208 Google knew that the
EU Commission on Competition investigation would be more in-depth than
the FTC Bureau of Competition’s investigation, and it therefore made concessions early in the investigation.209 Although the EU Commission on
Competition approved the merger under EU anti-trust law,210 it stated that
other EU bodies, such as the Article 29 Working Party would continue to

203

See Comment of Peter Fleischer in response to posting of Saul Hansell to N.Y. Times
Bits Blog, I.P. Address: Partially Personal Information, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008
/02/24/ip-address-partially-personal-information/#comment-113195 (Feb. 25, 2008, 04:42
EST).
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Posting of Alma Whitten to Google Public Policy Blog, Are IP addresses personal?,
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2008/02/are-ip-addresses-personal.html (Feb. 22,
2008, 12:31 PST).
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See Press Release, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 64th meeting (Feb. 19,
2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/news/docs/pr_18_19_02_08
_en.pdf (“The WP continued its deliberations on a long-awaited working paper on search
engines, with a view to finalising this work in the course of the next months.”).
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Data Protection and Freedom of Information Commissioner of the State of Berlin, Germany, 28th International Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners’ Conference, Resolution on Privacy Protection and Search Engines (Nov. 3, 2006), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/news/docs/pr_google_annex_16_05_07_en.pdf.
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See Press Release, European Commission, supra note 191.
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See Letter from Dr. Thilo Weichert, supra note 185.
209
See Victoria Shannon, Europe Delays Google Deal for DoubleClick, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
14, 2007, at C7 (stating that Google would “keep certain DoubleClick business practices
unchanged”).
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Press Release, European Commission on Competition, supra note 194.
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review Google’s privacy practices.211 The FTC Bureau of Competition’s
majority ruling on the Google-DoubleClick merger, however, ignored all
privacy concerns raised by various parties and failed to ensure that the FTC
Bureau of Consumer Protection would continue to closely watch Google’s
practices that impact privacy.212
V. SAFE HARBOR ENFORCEMENT LIMITATIONS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
As previously discussed, the Data Directive relies entirely on government enforcement mechanisms, whereas the Safe Harbor has a multiple
“layer” approach, incorporating primarily private-sector enforcement with
governmental action as a means of last resort.213 The Safe Harbor’s
“layered” approach seems, on its face, to give more protection. This section
seeks to counter this impression by showing that a multiple “layer” approach is both less efficient and counter to the objective of protecting privacy.
A.

Initial Registration Oversight by the U.S. Department of Commerce

1.

Safe Harbor Registration Processing Limitations

a.

Problem

As previously discussed, EU member states and the DOC use vastly
different pre-operation methods of enforcement.214 Some EU member states
take a pro-active approach to enforcement. For example, France’s Data Protection Authority limits all data operations of a company or organization
until it gives explicit approval that all of the Data Directive’s requirements
are met.215 The U.S. pre-operation enforcement arm for the Safe Harbor, the
DOC,216 however, does not rigorously enforce Safe Harbor registrations. A
leading privacy treatise states that the DOC role is only to approve applications217 without any scrutiny.218 Similarly, a 2004 EU commission found
211

Europe Clears Google DoubleClick Bid, supra note 195 (“Regulators said their decision
was based exclusively on the economic aspects of the deal and it had no bearing on the companies’ obligations under E.U. personal privacy protection rules or how personal data is
processed. European privacy regulators are now examining if the data protection policies of
search engines comply with existing E.U. law.”).
212
Press Release, Marc Rotenberg, supra note 181.
213
See supra Part III.C.2.a.
214
See supra Part III.C.
215
WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-14.
216
See supra Part III.B.1.
217
Safe Harbor Certification Information, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, http://www.export
.gov/safeharbor/SH_Cert_Info.asp (lists the requisite information to fill-out the online certification form).
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that the DOC failed to properly oversee Safe Harbor registrations because a
“substantial minority” of Companies the DOC certified for the Safe Harbor
did not have “visible” privacy policies.219 The DOC rejected these criticisms
and has stated that it tests the online privacy policies of Companies “to the
greatest extent possible.”220 The Department admits, though, that when a
Company’s privacy policy is not readily available online it merely “confirm[s] with the contact point that the policy is available upon request.”221
The DOC insists that its review is so rigorous that it eventually rejects approximately fifty-percent of all initial Safe Harbor applications due to deficiencies in at least one area.222 The rejection figure, however, may be due to
very mundane deficiencies, such as failure include a Company officer’s fax
number.223
The Safe Harbor’s failure to include any formal process for application review is surprising. The Safe Harbor, therefore, does not even require
the U.S. DOC to verify the existence of a Company’s privacy policies. This
is of great concern because it means that the FTC does not have the power
to punish websites that fail to publish required privacy statements.224 Courts
have interpreted that a failure to make a statement is not within the FTC
Act’s bar on deceptive practices.225
b.

Proposed Solution

If the DOC’s review process is as rigorous as it claims to be, then it
should use methods that are more transparent to EU Citizens—the people
the Safe Harbor purports to protect. This should involve a publicly disclosed
Safe Harbor acceptance review procedure that details, at a minimum, how
privacy policies are verified. Currently, if a Company’s privacy policy is not
readily available online, the DOC merely “confirm[s] with the contact point
that the policy is available upon request.”226 The DOC should demand that
218

WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-28 (“[The] safe harbor’s [has] a self-certification system
without mandatory independent verification of what a business actually does”).
219
See EU Safe Harbor Criticism, supra note 8, at 6–7.
220
U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework PowerPoint, supra note 59, notes accompanying slide
10.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
See Safe Harbor Certification Information, supra note 53 (listing the requisite information to fill-out the online certification form).
224
Pedersen, supra note 9, at 10.
225
See Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex III (“[T]he Federal Trade Commission . . . [can
only] take action against those who fail to protect the privacy of personal information in
accordance with their representations and/or commitments.”) (emphasis added).
226
U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework PowerPoint, supra note 59, notes accompanying slide
10.
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any Company’s privacy policy be readily available online and require a
Company to demonstrate how it would handle a privacy complaint.
c.

Difficulties with Proposed Solution

The first roadblock to a more formal Safe Harbor review process
may be the Safe Harbor itself. Companies will probably be unwilling to
open up their files for verification of compliance by a government body
without a clear legal requirement to do so, which the Safe Harbor lacks.
This problem is a running theme in this Note’s proposed solutions. Even if
the DOC made a goodwill gesture and invoked more procedures to fulfill
the spirit of the Data Directive—and even if those changes were made at the
request of EU member states and their Data Protection Authorities—the
DOC it has no legal basis to make a change. All that is legally required is
outlined in the Safe Harbor.
The only way for EU member states to create a legal requirement
for change is for the EU to directly reverse itself and find that the current
Safe Harbor protections are not adequate. Only then could EU member
states force U.S. agencies back to the negotiating table to enact greater enforcement protections. Nevertheless, an EU reversal regarding the adequacy
of the Safe Harbor protections would be a significant revocation that would
likely harm any later negotiations.
The second roadblock to a more formal Safe Harbor review process
is the budget for DOC. The DOC devotes only twenty minutes to review
each online Safe Harbor application and forty minutes for each paper application.227 Additionally, the DOC will only commit 550 hours annually to the
Safe Harbor.228 The DOC has only allotted itself $190,250 annually for the
entire Safe Harbor program.229
2.

Few Safe Harbor registrants

a.

Problem

The DOC must also overcome the lack of Safe Harbor registrants.
Initially, the DOC estimated 1,500 Companies would register annually;230
however, after more than seven years, the Safe Harbor program currently
has only 1,300 Companies, of which approximately one-fifth have failed to

227

Information for Certification Under FAQ 6 of the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, 65
Fed. Reg. 66,690 (proposed Nov. 7, 2000).
228
Id.
229
Id. The Federal Register has a typo that indicates the dollar amount as “$19,0250,”
which should read “$190,250.”
230
Id.

2009]

EU-U.S. DATA PRIVACY SAFE HARBOR

223

complete the required annual re-certification.231 These “numbers are insignificant and a poor return for the effort that was put into establishing the Safe
Harbor framework.”232 A 2004 EU commission on the Safe Harbor similarly found that the “number of registered [Safe Harbor] organisations is lower
than initially anticipated and this is a cause of disappointment.”233 In March
2005, the DOC attempted to resolve the lack of registrants by lowering the
Safe Harbor registration fee from between $150–500 annually, based on
annual revenue, to only $50 across the board.234 Such a small cost, however,
was likely not a barrier for any multi-million or multi-billion dollar Company.
b.

Proposed solution

The DOC should eliminate all Safe Harbor registration fees and further educate Companies that registering for the Safe Harbor can limit a
Company’s liability. The DOC is heading in the right direction and recently
completed a two-day information session235 for Companies on the various
methods of complying with the Data Directive, including the Safe Harbor.236 Unfortunately, the event was limited to only 150 attendees237 and
most of the presentations on the Safe Harbor only described the basic registration requirements and failed to highlight the benefits of the Safe Harbor.238 One of the presenters at the conference—Ms. Joan Antokol, a partner
at the Baker & Daniels law firm—specifically highlighted where the DOC
should focus its efforts in the future.239 Ms. Antokol stated that most companies do not register for the Safe Harbor because there is: (1) a lack of perceived need; (2) hesitation by Company in-house counsel; (3) a lack of
231
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233
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http://safeharbor.govtools.us/agenda.aspx (last visited Oct 28, 2008).
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See, e.g., Damon C. Greer, Safe Harbor Program, The U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor Framework (Oct. 15, 2007), http://www.safeharbor.govtools.us/documents/1A_DOC_Greer.ppt;
Giovanni Butarelli, Secretary General, The European Union’s Data Protection Framework 12
Years Later (Oct. 15–16, 2007), http://www.safeharbor.govtools.us/documents/1B_IT%20
Garante_Butarelli1.ppt.
239
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awareness about where to begin; and (4) little or no awareness of the benefits of the program.240
B.

The Enforcement Principle

There are several problems with the Enforcement Principle’s selfregulatory approach. This section discusses the problems with the Enforcement Principle’s “independent recourse mechanism” and verification requirements. This section concludes that the only viable solution is to eliminate the self-regulatory Enforcement Principle requirements because privacy self-regulation is counter to the goal of protecting privacy.
1.

Criticisms of the Enforcement Principle’s independent recourse
mechanism and the Guarantee to Remedy requirements

a.

Lack of statutory commands

The Enforcement Principle’s “independent recourse mechanism”
requirement241 allows for an arbitrary level of sanctions because it lacks any
traditional statutory language commands. Although the Safe Harbor seems
to specify a strict “base” level of remedy, the language of the Safe Harbor is
largely suggestive and not obligatory. For example, the Safe Harbor Enforcement Principle states that an “independent recourse mechanism”
“should” reverse or correct the effects of non-compliance “in so far as feasible,” and then, “where appropriate, th[e] processing of the personal data of
the individual who has brought the complaint will cease.”242 The Safe Harbor section on “independent recourse mechanisms” goes on to suggest what
other sanctions a recourse body “could” include.243
Similar to the Enforcement Principle’s “independent recourse mechanism,” the Enforcement Principle’s guarantee to remedy requirement244
has only one line with traditional statutory language that includes words
such as “must” or “shall.” The Enforcement Principle’s guarantee to remedy
requirement states that any “independent recourse mechanism” “must” notify both the DOC and the governmental body with applicable jurisdiction if a
Company fails to comply with the procedures and remedies demanded by
the “independent recourse mechanism.”245 The “must” commandment, however, may never become an issue because an “independent recourse mechanism” is not required to impose any level of sanction to begin with.
240
241
242
243
244
245

Id.
See supra Part III.B.3.a.
Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
See supra Part III.B.3.c.
Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II (emphasis added).
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Therefore, if an “independent recourse mechanism” does not sanction a
Company, then an “independent recourse mechanism” never “must” refer
the company to any U.S. regulatory agency for non-compliance. The Enforcement Principle, therefore, gives the “independent recourse mechanism”
infinite discretion, and hence the Enforcement Principle’s guarantee to remedy is ineffective. Thus, Companies have an incentive to search for an
“independent recourse mechanism” that, in the event of a violation, would
give the lightest sanctions or no sanctions at all.
b.

Types of Independent Recourse Mechanisms

As discussed, the Enforcement Principle’s “independent recourse
mechanism” requirement may be fulfilled in one of four ways.246 The following criticisms address the methods of fulfilling the “independent recourse mechanism” requirement.
i.

Private-sector privacy programs

First, the Enforcement Principle’s “independent recourse mechanism” requirement allows Companies to use private-sector privacy programs.247 Private-sector privacy programs, such as TRUSTe248 and BBBOnline,249 are organizations that assist Companies create and implement privacy policies. Private-sector privacy programs can be ineffective, though, because the Safe Harbor, as just discussed, has no requisite level of sanctions.250 Companies are free to shop around for private-sector privacy programs that have a history of lenient enforcement. For example, BBBOnline
has forty-five Companies registered with its Safe Harbor compliance program.251 The BBBOnline program has large Company participants with data
that may be particularly sensitive, such as Careerbuilder.com, which has
data on work histories and resumes, and Amazon.com, which has data on
purchase histories and credit card payments.252 The BBBOnline has no set
rules for sanctions.253 If a Company were to either fail to publish its privacy
policy or fail to fulfill its privacy policy, then under the BBBOnline program, a Company has the option of “propos[ing] alternative corrective ac246

See supra Part III.B.3.a.
Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II.
248
TRUSTe.com, http://www.truste.com/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2008).
249
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250
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BBBONLINE, SAFE HARBOR PRIVACY DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURE, § 3.3.1 (Apr. 9,
2003), http://www.bbbonline.org/privacy/DataPrivacyDRRules.pdf.
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tion with regard to its privacy policies or practices to remedy the noncompliance.”254 Additionally, the entire process can take up to six months before
BBBOnline reports a violation to a government enforcement agency.255
In 2004, an EU commission on the Safe Harbor raised similar concerns about private-sector privacy programs serving as a Company’s “independent recourse mechanism.” The EU commission on the Safe Harbor
found that private-sector privacy programs “do not seem to foresee ways to
remedy situations of failure to abide by the Principles.”256
ii.

Vague independent recourse mechanisms

Second, the Enforcement Principle’s “independent recourse mechanism” requirement allows Companies to employ other private-sector
“independent recourse mechanisms” so long as the “independent recourse
mechanisms” “meet the requirements of the Enforcement Principle and the
FAQs.”257 A new trend is developing in this area, whereby recent Safe Harbor applications of various Companies list arbitration associations as their
chosen “independent recourse mechanism.” In a random sampling of fifty of
the Safe Harbor Companies, four large Companies—Hard Rock Cafe International, ConAgra Foods, Eastman Kodak Company, and Electronic Arts—
list arbitration associations as the Company’s “independent recourse mechanism.”258 This is extremely disturbing because arbitrators in the U.S. are
under no requirement to follow the letter of the law.259 The fact that arbitrators do not have to rule after considering and applying the law bars arbitra254

Id.
See id. This is a maximum, but perfectly acceptable both by the Safe Harbor Agreement
and the BBBOnline procedure terms. This total was calculated by adding the time a company
has to respond to a complaint (§ 3.2.2, 15 business days), the complainant reply process (§
3.2.4, 10 business days), the response to a reply process (§ 3.2.5, 10 business days), the request for additional information process (§ 3.2.6, 10 business days), the initial decision
process (§ 3.3, 20 business days), a request for appeal (§ 4.2.1, 15 business days), a response
to the appeal (§ 4.2.4, 10 business days), an appeal decision (§ 4.7.1, 20 business days), a
respondent’s statement to add to the appeal decision (§ 4.7.2, 10 business days), the verification of performance process (§ 5, 30 days), and a ten-day warning period (§ 1.12). Id.
256
EU Safe Harbor Criticism, supra note 8, at 11.
257
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258
See Safe Harbor List, supra note 51.
259
Arbitrations over Safe Harbor disagreements would necessarily be international in
scope. International law is solely under the jurisdiction of the U.S. federal government, and
therefore any arbitration stemming from a Safe Harbor disagreement would fall under the
Federal Arbitration Act. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§
1-4 (1994)). Arbitrators under the Federal Arbitration Act are not required to rule based on
any law. 3 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 37.4.1, at 37:10 (1999)
(stating that arbitrators have no obligation under the Federal Arbitration Act “to make findings of fact or conclusions of law, or otherwise to give reasons for their awards”).
255
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tion associations as “independent recourse mechanisms” because they are
not required to adhere to the “Enforcement Principle and the FAQs.”260
In addition, arbitration associations have a strong economic incentive to rule in favor of Companies that provide their work. For example, Mr.
Richard Neely, a retired West Virginia Supreme Court chief justice, said
that arbitration associations ask for
substantial costs related to the arbitration itself. . . . In one case that I handled, the fees alone amounted to $450. Furthermore, the arbitration company sends the arbitrator a judgment form already filled out so that all the
arbitrator need do is check the appropriate box. . . . In my case I did not
award the [defendant company] the litigation-related fees. . . . I never got
another case!261

Finally, the Safe Harbor explicitly requires any “independent recourse mechanism” be “readily available, and affordable” to a potential
complainant.262 Arbitration fees can be costly,263 and neither Hard Rock
Cafe International, ConAgra Foods, Eastman Kodak Company, nor Electronic Arts state in their Safe Harbor registrations that they will pay the arbitration fees on behalf of a complainant.264 Therefore, even if arbitration associations were an acceptable “independent recourse mechanism,” Companies still would have to pay the vast majority of arbitration fees to make
complaints “affordable” to an EU Citizen.265
A 2004 EU commission on the Safe Harbor raised similar concerns
about arbitration associations serving as a Company’s “independent recourse mechanism.” The 2004 EU commission on the Safe Harbor stated
that arbitration associations “lack transparency insofar as they operate without properly informing individuals as to how the dispute resolution procedure works to file a complaint for alleged failure to abide by the Principles.”266
iii.

Nonexistent independent recourse mechanisms

Third, the Enforcement Principle’s “independent recourse mechanism” requirement allows Companies to use “compliance with legal or regu260

See Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II.
Richard Neely, Arbitration and the Godless Bloodsuckers, THE WEST VIRGINIA
LAWYER, Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 12, 12., available at http://www.wvbar.org/barinfo/lawyerr/2
006/septoct2006.pdf.
262
Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex I.
263
See Neely, supra note 261, at 12.
264
Safe Harbor List, supra note 51.
265
See Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II.
266
EU Safe Harbor Criticism, supra note 8, at 11.
261
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latory supervisory authorities that provide for handling of individual complaints and dispute resolution” as an acceptable “independent recourse mechanism” option.267 On its face, the Safe Harbor seems to indicate that
Companies can hire anyone to listen to and resolve EU Citizen complaints.
As previously discussed,268 it appears that some Companies have interpreted
this language to indicate that an “independent recourse mechanism” can
include a Company’s own internal complaint process.269 At the outset, to
allow a Company’s “independent recourse mechanism” to be the Company
itself is a self-contradiction. It is hard to imagine a Company that would
discuss a possible Safe Harbor violation directly with its customer and then
refer the matter to a government enforcement body after a failure to reach a
resolution. Companies that list their own internal resolution measures as
their “independent recourse mechanism” fail to understand the Safe Harbor’s intent. The Safe Harbor specifically states that EU Citizens are first
“encouraged to raise any complaints they may have with the relevant organization before proceeding to independent recourse mechanisms.”270 This
language shows that the meaning of “independent” clearly excludes the very
Company being complained about. Yet the Safe Harbor itself lacks guidance on what it means to be “independent.” The Safe Harbor states only that
“[w]hether a recourse mechanism is independent is a factual question that
can be demonstrated in a number of ways, for example, by transparent composition and financing or a proven track record.”271
iv.

Conclusion on the types of independent recourse mechanisms

Altogether, the statutory language of the Safe Harbor Enforcement
Principle’s “independent recourse mechanism” “layer” of protection is ineffective at ensuring compliance. Many Companies seem content with ignoring the clear intention of the Safe Harbor, and the DOC appears similarly
content to allow the Safe Harbor registration of such Companies. “Independent recourse mechanism” sanctions are arbitrary and leave no promise of
actual remedy for complainants. The Safe Harbor Enforcement Principle
seems to rely on self-regulation to the point of absurdity.

267

Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II.
See supra Part III.B.3.a.
269
See, e.g., Safe Harbor List, supra note 51. (listing Adaptec, Inc.’s “independent recourse
mechanism” as: “Consumer or Adaptec employee complaints will generally be escalated
internally to the Adaptec corporate legal department which will consult with management on
appropriate response or action depending on the facts at issue.”). Only after going through
Adaptec’s process unsuccessfully will it refer the matter to an EU Data Protection Authority.
270
Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II.
271
Id.
268
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Criticisms of the Enforcement Principle’s Verification Requirement

As explained earlier,272 a Company may choose to “self-verify” that
its stated privacy practices are actually implemented.273 Given the choice
between annual outside compliance reviews where the Safe Harbor requires
“without limitation auditing, random reviews, [and] use of ‘decoys,’ ”274
and the choice of “self-verification,” it is not surprising that very few Companies choose to use outside compliance reviews to fulfill the verification
requirement of the Enforcement Principle.275 Although a Company implementing “self-verification” is required to “retain their records on the implementation of their safe harbor privacy practices and make them available
upon request in the context of an investigation,”276 there is no requirement
for an “independent recourse mechanism” to employ additional sanctions if
a Company falsely “self-verifies.” It is conceivable, and fully within the
Safe Harbor guidelines, that a Company that acts willfully and in bad faith
will receive the same or lesser sanction than another Company that has attempted to adhere to the Safe Harbor requirements, but has nonetheless
committed a unintentional violation. Therefore, allowing “self-verification”
to fulfill the verification requirement of the Enforcement Principle seems to
dissuade proper implementation.
3.

Worst-case scenario

Under the current Enforcement Principle regime, a frugal and riskavoiding Company may take the following measures. A Company could fail
to publish a privacy policy initially, and hope the DOC would accept its
Safe Harbor registration, thereby evading FTC jurisdiction. Then a Company could choose an arbitration association that is known for ruling in favor
of Companies as its method of “independent recourse mechanism,” thereby
forcing a costly burden on an EU Citizen to initiate an action. Finally, the
Company could “self-verify” that it is complying with its unpublished privacy practices. Taken one at a time, these possibilities seem troubling; taken
together, they add up to a virtual guarantee that EU Citizen’s complaints
will be ignored, with no Safe Harbor repercussions.

272
273
274
275
276

See supra Part III.B.3.b.
Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II.
Id.
See WOLF, supra note 19, 14–28.
Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II.
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4.

Conclusion on the effectiveness of the Enforcement Principle

a.

Unintended consequences of the Enforcement Principle

Data breaches provide an example of the unintended consequences
of the Safe Harbor’s Enforcement Principle. Identity theft in the U.S. is at
an all time high, with a recent survey showing that 8.3 million American
adults, or 3.7 percent of all American adults, were victims of identity theft
in 2005.277 Thirty-two percent of the fraud complaints the FTC received in
2007 were in regards to identity theft.278 Although it is impossible to tell
what proportion of identity thefts are the result of data breaches at the company level, Companies likely store data from EU Citizens at the same locations—with the same level of security—as the Company’s U.S. customers.
Statistics are not available for the entire EU, but identity theft in the United
Kingdom is on the rise.279 In 2006, approximately 100,000 United Kingdom
citizens had their identity stolen annually, costing the United Kingdom
economy £1.7 billion annually.280
Some U.S. states require companies to notify customers that may be
affected by a data-breach, but U.S. state laws vary widely.281 In contrast,
under the Safe Harbor, a Company has no explicit requirement to notify EU
Citizens affected by a data-breach. Therefore, an EU Citizen may be able to
detect the end result of a data-breach in the form of a stolen identity, but an
EU Citizen would be unable to pinpoint which Company was the source of
infraction. Without knowing which Company is responsible, an EU Citizen
cannot seek the assistance of any Company’s “independent recourse mechanism.” Any EU Citizen’s effort to find which Company was the source
of the privacy violation would likely be fruitless. In this situation, the Safe
Harbor Enforcement Principle “layer” only serves to delay or prevent resolution. In contrast, EU Citizens whose identities are stolen from a United
Kingdom company are under the full protection of the Data Directive that
277

Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Releases Survey of Identity Theft in the U.S.
Study Shows 8.3 Million Victims in 2005 (Nov. 27, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/1
1/idtheft.shtm. See also FED. TRADE COMM’N, 2006 IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT (2007),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/11/SynovateFinalReportIDTheft2006.pdf.
278
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Releases List of Top Consumer Fraud Complaints in 2007 (Feb. 13, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/02/fraud.shtm.
279
See FRAUD PREVENTION EXPERT GROUP, REPORT ON IDENTITY THEFT/FRAUD (Oct. 22,
2007), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/fpeg/docs/id-theft-report_en.pdf.
280
Id. at 8.
281
Currently thirty-eight states have data-breach notifications laws, but only a handful of
those states provide a private right-of-action. See Scott Berinato, Data Breach Notification
Laws, State By State, CSO Disclosure Series, Feb. 12, 2008, http://www.csoonline.com/read
/020108/ammap/ammap.html. See also Posting of Tanya Forsheit to Privacy Law Blog,
Breach Law Data, http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2007/08/articles/security-breachnotification-l/breach-law-data/ (Aug. 3, 2007).
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provides immediate assistance through the Data Directive’s Data Protection
Authorities.282
b.

Fixing the Enforcement Principle

The Safe Harbor Enforcement Principle should be eliminated and
replaced with an enforcement mechanism similar to the Data Directive.283
Eliminating the current Safe Harbor Enforcement Principle would enable an
independent government agency with meaningful investigatory powers to
act sua sponte to police privacy violations, such as data thefts, as soon as an
EU Citizen discovers them. This solution, however, would require giving
additional powers to a consumer-protection agency such as the FTC. The
remaining sections of Part V address how to implement a more proactive
FTC, with respect to the Safe Harbor, to properly guard against privacy
violations.
Some may object, arguing that there is a need for private sector recourse remains in order to resolve simple complaints. It is admittedly helpful to have resolution procedures run by non-governmental agencies, to resolve mundane complaints and dismiss unsubstantiated complaints, however, mundane and unsubstantiated complaints can be settled at the Company
level. It is important to stress that having only one official enforcement
“layer” in the form of a U.S. government agency does not preclude an EU
Citizen from resolving issues directly with a Company. Effective privacy
enforcement requires a U.S. agency be available to EU Citizens at all times.
This will ensure that EU Citizens’ privacy is monitored on a macro level
and that EU Citizens’ can immediately turn to a U.S. agency to address
complex data privacy issues such as data breaches.
C.

Government Agency Enforcement through the Federal Trade Commission

1.

The Federal Trade Commission’s limited jurisdiction within the
United States

FTC’s power is limited in scope by statute.284 The FTC does not
have the authority to regulate banks, saving and loans, credit unions, telecommunications, interstate transportation, common carriers, or air carriers.285 As discussed earlier, the only other governmental agency that has
committed to enforcing the Safe Harbor is the Department of Transportation, which regulates interstate transportation, common carriers, and air
282
283
284
285

See infra Part V.C.2.a. (completing the analysis of the data breach example).
See supra Part III.C.1. (discussing the Data Directive’s enforcement mechanisms).
See 15 U.S.C §§ 41–58 (2006).
Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex VII. See also 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
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carriers.286 Banking and telecommunication Companies cannot register for
the Safe Harbor unless and until the respective governing bodies commit to
enforcement.287 The Federal Communications Commission—regulating the
telecommunications industry—and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency—regulating the banking industry—have simply refused to commit
themselves to Safe Harbor enforcement.288 Banking and telecommunication
Companies, therefore, must rely on one of the two alternative methods for
complying with the Data Directive: Binding Corporate Rules or PreApproved contracts.289 Because Companies do not uniformly comply with
the Data Directive under the Safe Harbor, EU Citizens may be confused as
to what recourse they have for privacy concerns and violations. Further, EU
Citizens may be confused which, if any, regulatory body to contact for assistance.
Additionally, the FTC does not have authority to regulate non-profit
Companies.290 The FTC Act states that the FTC can regulate organizations
“affecting commerce.”291 Commerce is a legal term of art that has been interpreted to mean a great number of things. American courts have given the
term “commerce” a very broad definition, for the purposes of interpreting
U.S. Congressional authority to regulate under the commerce clause of the
U.S. Constitution’s article 1, section 8.292 In the case of the FTC, however,
U.S. courts have interpreted the term commerce narrowly, allowing the FTC
to regulate only traditional businesses—purveyors of goods and services.293

286

See supra Part III.C.2.b.
See Export.gov, Safe Harbor Workbook, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SH_wo
rkbook.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2008).
288
See id. See also Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex VII.
289
See supra Part III.A.
290
See Letter from Robert Pitofsky to John Mogg, Director, DG XV (July 14, 2000),
http://www.export.gov/static/SH_FTC_Letter.pdf. See also Export.gov, Safe Harbor Enforcement Overview, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SH_enforcement_overview.asp (last
visited Oct. 6, 2008).
291
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
292
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
293
See Letter from Robert Pitofsky to John Mogg, Director, DG XV, supra note 290. See
also Export.gov, supra note 290.
287
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2.

The Federal Trade Commission’s limited international jurisdiction

a.

Problem

Although the FTC Act allows the FTC to regulate “commerce . . .
with foreign nations,”294 U.S. court interpretations of the FTC Act have held
that the FTC does not have power to pursue “unfair deceptive acts or practices”295 affecting only foreigners. For example, in Nieman v. DryClean
U.S.A. Franchise Company, the U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that “the FTC Act does not clearly indicate that Congress intended
the [FTC] Act to apply extraterritorially.”296 Therefore, the FTC’s authority
over foreign “unfair deceptive acts or practices”297 only extends when there
is a domestic impact.298 Failure to understand that the FTC lacks jurisdiction
to pursue violations affecting only foreigners was blatant oversight by the
EU Data Protection Authorities that negotiated the Safe Harbor.
b.

Proposed solution

The Safe Harbor perhaps could rely on individual U.S. states’ attorney generals to be a substitute for the FTC’s current inability to pursue foreign “unfair deceptive acts or practices” because, as previously discussed,
U.S. states have the power to regulate some aspects of privacy law.299 U.S.
states, however, are pre-empted from regulating issues of international
scope.300
The only remaining solution, therefore, is to increase the scope of
the FTC’s authority to pursue foreign “unfair deceptive acts or practices.”
Thankfully, the FTC can easily increase the scope of its power on its own.
294

15 U.S.C. § 44 (2006).
15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
296
Nieman v. DryClean U.S.A. Franchise Company, Inc., 178 F.3d 1126, 1130 (11th Cir.
1999).
297
15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
298
See Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31, 34–35 (7th Cir. 1944) (holding that the FTC has jurisdiction to regulate an entity’s conduct with respect to foreign customers based on the effect
on domestic competition).
299
See supra Part V.B.4.a (discussing U.S. state data breach notification laws).
300
For example, Massachusetts vs. Environmental Protection Agency declared that “when
a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives. . . . [States] cannot
negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and in some circumstances the exercise of
[a State’s] police powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle emissions might well be preempted.” Mass. vs. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007). See also Crosby v. National Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding that Congress preempted a Massachusetts law
that banned companies from doing business in Burma because, even though Congress was
silent on preemption, the state law was an obstacle to implied objectives of federal Burma
sanctions).
295
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Under U.S. administrative law, the FTC is free to interpret its own originating statute, the FTC Act,301 so long as the originating statute was not already
unambiguous on the matter.302 Although the FTC Act already, unambiguously, appears to allow the FTC to regulate “commerce . . . with foreign
nations,”303 U.S. courts have limited this language.304 Nevertheless, the FTC
could simply promulgate a rule305 interpreting its own originating statute,
the FTC Act, and allow itself to pursue foreign “unfair deceptive acts or
practices” despite the prior court rulings.306 The FTC’s new interpretation,
though contrary to the previous court rulings, takes precedent.307
3.

The Federal Trade Commission’s limited investigatory powers

a.

Problem

Under normal circumstances, the FTC Act allows the FTC to pursue
outside investigation requests from five groups: (1) the U.S. Attorney General;308 (2) the U.S. President;309 (3) the U.S. Congress;310 (4) U.S. courts;311
and (5) the general public.312 Additionally, the FTC can initiate investigations on its own.313 The FTC Act appears to give the FTC broad investigatory powers; however, under the Safe Harbor, the FTC limited its own inves301

15 U.S.C §§ 41–58 (2006).
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (holding that if Congress has not directly spoken on an issue of an administrative
agency’s power, then courts should defer to an agency’s construction of their own originating
statute so long as such construction is reasonable).
303
15 U.S.C. § 44.
304
See, e.g., Nieman v. DryClean U.S.A. Franchise Co., 178 F.3d 1126, 1130 (11th Cir.
1999) (stating that “the FTC Act does not clearly indicate that Congress intended the [FTC]
Act to apply extraterritorially”).
305
Rulemaking is procedure under administrative law where a U.S. governmental agency
creates a rule that has the force of law after a notice and comment period. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
Further discussion on the requirements of rulemaking and administrative law are beyond the
scope of this Note.
306
See Nieman, 178 F.3d at 1130.
307
See National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services,
545 U.S. 967 (2005) (holding that prior judicial construction of an agency’s originating statute is only given force if the prior decision holds that statutory construction requires a certain construction based on unambiguous terms of the statute, leaving no room for agency
discretion).
308
FTC Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 2.1 (2008).
309
Id.
310
Id.
311
Id.
312
FTC Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 2.2 (2008).
313
15 U.S.C. § 46(a).
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tigatory power.314 One of the Safe Harbor documents is a letter written by
the FTC in response to the European Commission’s concerns about enforcement.315 The FTC stated that it would “give priority to referrals of
non-compliance with safe harbor principles.”316 “Referral” is a critical word
that refers to the Safe Harbor Enforcement Principle’s guarantee to remedy
requirement, which states that any “independent recourse mechanism” must
notify both the DOC and the governmental body with applicable jurisdiction—usually the FTC—if a Company fails to comply with the procedures
and remedies demanded by the “independent recourse mechanism.”317
Therefore, under the Safe Harbor, the FTC may only receive investigation
requests from “independent recourse mechanisms.” Additionally, even if the
FTC receives an investigation request from an “independent recourse mechanism,” the Safe Harbor fails to require the FTC to act; instead, the Safe
Harbor only states that the FTC will “give priority” to “independent recourse mechanism” investigation requests.318 An EU Citizen, therefore, has
no recourse if the FTC does not investigate a Company—despite an investigation request from the Company’s “independent recourse mechanism.” An
EU Citizen could only submit a hard-to-locate complaint319 to his or her
country’s Data Protection Authority and hope that the Data Protection Authority will convince the FTC to reconsider and take action on the “independent recourse mechanism” investigation request.
Some Companies have stated that they have chosen not to join the
Safe Harbor because of the very real possibility that, even if a matter were
referred to the FTC by an “independent recourse mechanism,” the FTC
could take no action. British Petroleum’s group privacy and data protection
manager state that British Petroleum did not join the Safe Harbor because it
“lacked the desired teeth to physically bind BP’s affiliates to the Safe Harbor principles.”320 Even if the FTC were to follow up on an investigation
request from an “independent recourse mechanism,” both the EU Citizen
whose privacy is at issue and any concerned third party, such as the Article

314

See Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex V.
See Letter from Robert Pitofsky to John Mogg, Director, DG XV, supra note 290.
316
Id. (emphasis added).
317
See Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II.
318
Id. annex V.
319
See Communication & Information Resource Centre Administrator (CIRCA) Date
Protection Panel, Standard Complaint Form, http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/secureida/safe
harbor/library?l=/public_folder/complaint_form&vm=detailed&sb=Title (last visited Aug.
31, 2008).
320
Pedersen, supra note 9, at 3.
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29 Working Party, would have no standing on any investigation that the
FTC conducts.321
In summation, EU Citizens that ordinarily rely on EU member state
Data Protection Authorities to protect their privacy rights322 are forced to
become their own police agents and report unresolved violations on their
own.323 Continuing with the data breach example,324 EU Citizens seem particularly ill suited to detect data breaches occurring in the U.S., save for
well-reported data thefts. The majority of data privacy concerns stem from
one of two circumstances. The first situation is when there is a private sale
of personal information—for example, to a marketing company willing to
pay for personal home addresses—where both parties to the transaction
would rarely be open about their actions. The second scenario is when a
Company is “hacked” and personal information is stolen from it. Some
Companies may want to keep quiet about the breach of security. In both of
these scenarios, the FTC’s self-limitation on enforcing the Safe Harbor
means that there is no centralized regulatory body that can remedy the data
breach privacy violations in a uniform manner.
b.

Proposed Solution

The DOC and the Data Protection Authorities should amend the
Safe Harbor to compel FTC oversight and allow for investigation requests
directly from EU Citizens and third-party organizations. A 2004 EU commission on the Safe Harbor similarly urged the FTC to “undertake sua
sponte investigations where questions exist regarding Safe Harbour compliance.”325 The FTC already has procedures in place for accepting public
complaints.326 Additionally, many third-party non-governmental organizations would voluntarily help the FTC enforce the Safe Harbor, such as the
Electronic Privacy Information Center327 and the Electronic Frontier Foundation.328 Finally, each EU member state’s Data Protection Authority has its
321

PETER C. WARD, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 3–16
(Law Journal Press, Release 39, 2007) (“[P]rivate third-party complainants [are excluded] as
formal parties to Commission proceedings . . . ”). See also Rodgers v. FTC, 492 F.2d 228,
229 (9th Cir. 1974).
322
See supra Part III.C.1.
323
See supra Part V.B.4.a (discussing how an EU Citizen would be unlikely to pinpoint the
source of a stolen identity).
324
Id.
325
EU Safe Harbor Criticism, supra note 8, at 10.
326
See Federal Trade Commission, FTC Consumer Complaint Form, https://rn.ftc.gov/pl
s/dod/wsolcq$.startup?Z_ORG_CODE=PU01/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2008).
327
See Electronic Privacy Information Center, http://www.epic.org/ (last visited Aug. 26,
2008).
328
See Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2008).
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own research abilities.329 The Data Protection Authorities would undoubtedly be willing to research potential violations of privacy on behalf of EU
citizens and forward the information to the FTC.
It would take a large bureaucracy to oversee hundreds of Company’s privacy protection initiatives, and the FTC may not have the resources
to devote to many investigations given the scope of data exchange between
the EU and U.S.330 Additionally, the FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection’s
Division of Enforcement and Privacy are probably more motivated to use
their limited resources331 to enforce laws that have a direct impact on Americans. The FTC, however, would not have to use many resources, if it received assistance from non-governmental organization and Data Protection
Authority investigations and complaints.
If the Safe Harbor were amended to force FTC oversight and allow
for investigation requests directly from EU Citizens and non-governmental
organizations, then the Enforcement Principle would need to be completely
rewritten. The new Enforcement Principle should be flexible enough to take
a common law approach similar to the Data Directive, but should also codify ongoing interpretations of the Safe Harbor. This would give Companies
more concrete notice of actions that violate the Safe Harbor.
As previously discussed, the Data Directive employs a common law
adjudication approach to enforcement.332 A common law approach is useful
for dealing with new situations and to adjudicating by analogy; however,
the new Enforcement Principle should also inform Companies of the current
state of the law. To accomplish this, the FTC should use its power to promulgate rules.333 Since 1962, the FTC has promulgated rules that define specific acts as unfair or deceptive.334 After the FTC promulgates a rule under
§57a(a)(1)(B), any violation of that rule is considered a per se unfair or deceptive act or practice under the FTC Act.335 Therefore, as the FTC adjudicates new privacy cases, the FTC may promulgate new rules to reflect the
329

See
European Commission, National Data Protection Commissioners,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/nationalcomm/index_en.htm (last visited Aug.
26, 2008).
330
In 2004, the U.S. and its six largest European trade partners shared approximately $400
billion in trade. U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework PowerPoint, supra note 59, at slide 3.
331
See WARD, supra note 321, at 2–3 (“As federal bureaucracies go, the Federal Trade
Commission is small. Its annual budget is approximately $156 million and it has a total staff
of approximately 1000.”).
332
See supra Part III.C.1 (“Data Protection Authorities give prior privacy adjudications a
res judicata effect when litigating new cases.”).
333
See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a) (2006). For a brief discussion of these rules and rulemaking, see
supra note 305.
334
The FTC’s rulemaking authority was later upheld as constitutional. See Nat’l Petroleum
Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
335
15 U.S.C. § 57a(d)(3).
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new adjudications. Additionally, the FTC could pass annual or bi-annual
rulemakings that implement new understandings of the Data Directive, as
interpreted by the Article 29 Working Party resolutions and the Data Protection Authorities. The FTC rulemakings would save the FTC time and resources in adjudicating new cases.
Peter Fleischer, Google’s Chief Privacy Counsel, has complained
that it is difficult to keep track of different countries’ privacy laws.336 Mr.
Fleischer stated that “[t]o be effective, privacy laws need to go global. . . .
[Privacy] standards must be strong and credible but above all, they must be
clear and they must be workable.”337 FTC rulemakings would be a good
step towards quelling Mr. Fleischer’s concerns by harmonizing EU and U.S.
data protection law.
4.

The Federal Trade Commission enforcement is prepared to regulate
privacy violations

The FTC has the experience necessary to regulate Companies that
transfer EU Citizen data. The FTC could protect EU Citizens better in two
circumstances. The DOC and the Data Protection Authorities could agree to
amend the Safe Harbor to compel FTC oversight and allow for investigation
requests directly from EU Citizens and non-governmental organizations.338
Alternatively, even if the Safe Harbor agreement is not amended, the FTC
could increase investigations and enforcement under U.S. law against Companies that are members of the Safe Harbor. Companies that violate U.S.
privacy law are likely the same Companies, which would also be abusing
the Safe Harbor principles.
In the past, the FTC has vacillated on its role to regulate consumer
privacy violations. In 1999, the FTC officially supported Company selfregulation for issues of privacy.339 In 2000, however, after completing a
survey on website privacy policies, the FTC recommended legislation to
protect privacy.340 Despite the FTC’s change of heart, when George W.
336

See Posting of Peter Fleischer to Peter Fleischer: Privacy...?, The Need for Global Privacy Standards, http://peterfleischer.blogspot.com/2007/09/need-for-global-privacy-stand
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338
See supra Part V.C.3.b.
339
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS (July 27, 1999), http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/07/privacy99.pdf.
340
Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace: Hearing
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Bush appointed a new head FTC commissioner, the FTC’s policy reverted
to privacy self-regulation.341 Today, the FTC polices online privacy in four
areas: (1) U.S. consumer access to their own information; (2) U.S. consumer
choice about use of their information; (3) U.S. consumer opportunity to
correct errors in collected information; and (4) security of information from
unauthorized use.342
The FTC’s earliest effort of applying the FTC Act to online privacy
was a 1999 prosecution of GeoCities, a website hosting service.343 GeoCities offered free and fee-based web hosting services after consumers filled
out an online form that included some questions that were mandatory and
other questions that were optional.344 The form also asked if applicants
wished to receive offers from advertisers.345 The FTC alleged that the
GeoCities website misled customers to believe that advertisers would only
receive the information consumers provided in the mandatory sections, including name and address.346 Instead, GeoCities also shared the information
that consumers provided in the optional form sections, including education
level, income, marital status, occupation, and interests.347 The FTC settled
with GeoCities in return for GeoCities’ agreement to post a privacy policy
that informed consumers what information was being collected and for what
purpose, to whom it will be disclosed, and how consumers can access and
remove the information.348
The FTC has also successfully pursued several other corporations
for online privacy violations. In 2000, the FTC prosecuted ReverseAuction.com for harvesting consumers’ personal information from a competitor’s site and then sending deceptive spam to the consumers to solicit their
business.349 In 2000, the FTC prosecuted Toysmart.com for selling confistatement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the Fed. Trade Comm’n),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/testimonyprivacy.htm. See also FED. TRADE COMM’N, ONLINE
PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS: PART 2 RECOMMENDATIONS (July 2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/onlineprofiling.htm.
341
See TIMOTHY MURIS, PROTECTING CONSUMERS’ PRIVACY: 2002 AND BEYOND (Oct. 4,
2001), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/privisp1002.shtm.
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13, 1998), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/08/geocitie.shtm.
349
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Online Auction Site Settles FTC Privacy
Charges (Jan. 6, 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/01/reverse4.shtm. See also FTC v.
Reverseauction.com, FTC File No. 002-3046, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist
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dential, personal customer information collected on the Toysmart.com website, despite Toysmart.com’s privacy policy to the contrary.350 In 2001, the
FTC prosecuted Microsoft for falsely representing that its “Passport Wallet”
service, which stored customer credit card numbers and billing information,
was safer or more secure than purchases made at other websites without the
“Passport Wallet” service.351 In 2002, the FTC prosecuted the pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly for unintentionally disclosing the entire recipient list
of a Prozac refill-reminder service to every subscriber of the service.352 In
2002, the FTC prosecuted Guess.com—a website that sells Guess jeans—
for failing to take reasonable measures to prevent consumer information,
including credit card numbers, from being accessed by hackers.353 In 2004,
the FTC prosecuted Tower Direct—the company that owns Tower Records
and runs the Tower Records website—for a security flaw in the Tower
Records website that exposed customers’ personal information to other customers, in violation of Tower Direct’s privacy policy representations.354
Finally, in 2005, the FTC prosecuted Vision Properties—a company that
provided virtual “shopping cart” services to thousands of online merchants—for collecting and renting customer personal information sourced
from the online merchants that employed Vision Properties.355 Neither the
/reverseauction/index.shtm.
350
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351
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htm. See also In the Matter of Microsoft Corporation, FTC File No. 012-3240,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0123240/0123240.shtm.
352
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http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/06/guess.shtm. See also In the Matter of Guess?, Inc., and
Guess.com, Inc., FTC File No. 022-3260, http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0223260/index.sh
tm.
354
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355
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customers nor the online merchants that employed Vision Properties consented to collecting and renting the customer information.356
Finally, the FTC has recently taken several proactive steps to address online privacy. It has created an online tutorial to educate businesses
and other organizations about practical and low-cost data security methods.357 Additionally, it addressed the behavioral advertising issues raised
by online advertising and the merger of Google and DoubleClick.358 In November 2007, the FTC held a conference on behavioral advertising.359 In
response to input received at the conference, the FTC commissioner voted
unanimously to approve the release of new behavioral advertising privacy
principles.360 The FTC proposed that behavioral advertisers should: (1)
clearly state that consumer data is being collected; (2) allow consumers to
easily opt-out of data collection; (3) secure the customer data collected; (4)
retain customer data only “as long as is necessary to fulfill a legitimate
business or law enforcement need;” (5) obtain a customer’s “affirmative
express consent” if a behavioral advertiser wishes to use a customer’s data
for a “materially different purpose than was disclosed when the data was
collected;” and (6) obtain a customer’s “affirmative express consent” before
collecting “sensitive” consumer data—such as data on health and sexual
orientation.361 The FTC’s proposed behavior advertising principles are extremely similar to the Safe Harbor’s general requirements on data collection.362 The FTC’s recent proactive approach to privacy regulation shows
that it is prepared to undertake a larger role regulating privacy under a revised Safe Harbor.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although the EU may have initially believed that the Safe Harbor
Enforcement Principle’s “independent recourse mechanisms” could effectively enforce the Safe Harbor, it remains highly questionable whether the
current enforcement mechanisms are sufficient. The enforcement mechanisms in place appear ineffective and, therefore, are likely unable to deter
violators. Ineffective enforcement, in turn, creates deteriorating trust and
possibly reduced trade. The EU and the U.S. should renegotiate the Safe
Harbor’s Enforcement Principle and replace its ineffective “independent
recourse mechanisms” with FTC oversight. Broad FTC oversight would be
an effective Safe Harbor enforcement mechanism that would reconcile the
difference between EU and U.S. privacy laws.

